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ABSTRACT 
This Article offers a new interpretation of the modern federal immigration 
power. At the end of the nineteenth century, the Supreme Court and Congress 
fundamentally transformed the federal government's authority to regulate immi-
gration, from a species of commercial regulation firmly grounded in Congress's 
commerce authority, into a power that was unmoored from the Constitution, 
derived from the nation's "inherent sovereignty, " and subject to extraordinary 
judicial deference. This framework, which is commonly referred to as the "ple-
nary power doctrine," has stood for more than a century as an anomaly within 
American public law. The principal legal and rhetorical rationale for the ple-
nary power doctrine was and remains the supposition that the regulation of 
immigration is always inherently related to the conduct of foreign affairs, and, 
especially, to national security. 
By situating this radical yet extremely durable doctrinal transformation 
within its appropriate intellectual and political context, this Article seeks to de-
naturalize the "national security rationale" for immigration exceptionalism. It 
argues that the plenary power doctrine was borne of an urgent sense of national 
peril, the basic terms of which most contemporary policymakers, judges, and 
scholars would emphatically reject. Although the doctrine made its judicial de-
but in the Chinese Exclusion Case, its historical origins in fact lie largely be-
yond Chinese exclusion in a much broader contemporaneous critique of (mostly 
European) immigration. The late nineteenth-century architects of the plenary 
power doctrine believed that the unchecked immigration of economically de-
graded, politically inassimilable, and racially unfit immigrants had created a 
state of national emergency. In response, the Court fashioned an immigration 
power adapted not to the regulation of labor, or economic dependency, or 
crime-issues that, then as now, characterize most immigration lawmaking-
but rather to the defense of the nation against foreign aggression. 
Although the immigrants upon whom this power was exercised were citi-
zens of ostensibly "friendly" nations, policymakers and judges re-imagined them 
as enemy aliens. Through this process, the Court in effect invented the "immi-
grant" as a distinct, and distinctly consequential, legal construct. 
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INTRODUCTION 
It is a "fundamental premise of immigration law," the Supreme Court 
recently reaffirmed, that "[i]n the exercise of its broad power over naturali-
zation and immigration, Congress regularly makes rules that would be unac-
ceptable if applied to citizens."l Such constitutional latitude is warranted, 
the Court explained, because "any policy toward aliens is vitally and intri-
cately interwoven with contemporaneous policies in regard to the conduct of 
foreign relations, the war power, and the maintenance of a republican form 
of government."2 With this rationale, the Court upheld the mandatory deten-
tion of Hyung Joon Kim, a long-term permanent resident who had lived in 
the United States since age six, during the six-month pendency of his re-
moval proceedings.3 Kim had become subject to removal after he was twice 
caught shoplifting and later convicted of burglary for breaking into a tool 
shed with some high school friends-all within a ten-month period when he 
I Demore v. Hyung Joon Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 521 (2003) (quoting Mathews v. Diaz, 426 
U.S. 67, 79-80 (1976». 
21d. at 522 (quoting Mathews, 426 U.S. at 81 n.17). 
3 The Court upheld Section 1226(c) of the Immigration and Nationality Act ("INA"), 
"requiring the Attorney General to detain a subset of deportable criminal aliens pending a 
determination of their removability." Id. at 521. 
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was eighteen and nineteen years 01d.4 He had been detained without bail, 
notwithstanding the government's determination that he posed neither a 
flight risk nor a threat to the community.5 Exactly how Kim's detention bore 
on foreign relations, or war, or republican government, the Court never 
explained. 
The consignment of routine immigration matters such as Kim's-in-
volving, for example, removal for criminal convictions or visa noncompli-
ance-to the constitutional netherworld typically reserved for the conduct of 
war and foreign affairs is both constitutionally and morally striking. Yet this 
principle, which is commonly referred to as the "plenary power doctrine,"6 
is one of the most enduring constructs in American public law. Indeed, such 
extraordinary judicial deference has been a cardinal feature of the federal 
immigration power since the Supreme Court first adopted the plenary power 
doctrine in the 1889 Chinese Exclusion Case.7 Two basic elements define 
the doctrine. First, Congress's authority to regulate immigration derives not 
from any constitutionally enumerated power, but rather is "inherent" in the 
United States' "sovereignty" as an independent nation. Second, in its exer-
cise of that authority, Congress-and, by delegation, the Executive-is buf-
fered against judicially enforceable constitutional constraints.s The 
consequences for Hyung Joon Kim and millions of other immigrants can be 
profound and far-reaching. For non-citizens denied entry at the border, 
"[ w ]hatever the procedure authorized by Congress is, it is due process 
.... "9 Even long-term legal residents lack robust constitutional protections 
against, for example, improper detention during often lengthy removal pro-
ceedings;1O selection for removal because of otherwise constitutionally pro-
4 fur an informative overview of the Kim case, see Margaret H. Taylor, Demore v. Kim: 
Judicial Deference to Congressional Folly, in IMMIGRATION STORIES 343-76 (David A. Martin 
& Peter H. Schuck eds., 2005). 
5 See Kim, 538 U.S. at 515. The Immigration and Naturalization Service ("INS") had 
declared sua sponte during the district court proceeding "that Kim 'would not be considered a 
threat' and that any risk of flight could be met by a bond of $5,000." [d. at 541 (Souter, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
6 The use of the term "plenary power" to denote a power that is, as I will explain below, 
both unenumerated and buffered against constitutional review, is somewhat misleading. As 
Justice John Marshall made clear nearly two centuries ago, historically, "plenary" has referred 
to powers that are both enumerated in and constrained by the Constitution. He wrote: "If, as 
has always been understood, the sovereignty of Congress, though limited to specified objects, 
is plenary as to those objects, the power over commerce with foreign nations, and among the 
several States, is vested in Congress as absolutely as it would be in a single government, 
having in its constitution the same restrictions on the exercise of the power as are found in the 
[C]onstitution of the United States." Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. I, 197 (1824). 
7 Chae Chan Ping v. United States (The Chinese Exclusion Case), 130 U.S. 581, 609 
(1889). 
8 fur the classic formulation of the plenary power doctrine, see id. at 609; see also fung 
Vue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 705 (1893); Nishimura Ekiu v. United States, 142 
U.S. 651, 659 (1891). 
9 Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 544 (1950). 
10 See Demore v. Hyung Joon Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 540-41 (2003) (Souter, J., concurring in 
part and dissenting in part). 
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tected speech or associations; II or discrimination on the basis of alienage 
with respect to eligibility for public benefits. 12 As this partial list of constitu-
tional disabilities suggests, I3 the plenary power doctrine survived largely un-
scathed by Congress's broad liberalization of substantive immigration policy 
in 196514 and the revolution in civil rights and due process of the 1960s and 
1970s. Accordingly, scholars and courts alike have long noted, and often 
decried, the constitutional exceptionalism of the immigration power within 
American public law. ls 
This Article reconstructs the history of the federal immigration power, 
with two specific goals. First, it refines our understanding of the power's 
origins and development by explaining how the Supreme Court and Con-
gress transformed it from a species of commercial regulation grounded in 
Congress's constitutionally enumerated commerce authority and subject to 
judicially enforceable constraints, into a power inherent in national sover-
eignty and buffered against constitutional review. Second, the Article seeks 
to denaturalize the basic legal and rhetorical rationale for immigration ex-
11 See Reno v. Arab-American Anti-Discrimination Comm'n, 525 U.S. 471 (1999). 
12 See Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 80-84 (1976). 
13 Constitutional deference likewise applies, for example, to the substantive criteria of 
exclusion and deportation of non-citizens, the mandatory detention of inadmissible non-citi-
zens and of some non-citizens subject to removal, the limitation of judicial review of removal 
decisions, and the retroactive application of new grounds for removal. See GERALD L. 
NEUMAN, STRANGERS TO THE CONSTITUTION: iMMIGRANTS, BORDERS, AND FUNDAMENTAL 
LAW 14 (1996); Barbara Hines, An Overview of u.s. Immigration Law and Policy Since 9111, 
12 TEX. HISP. J.L. & POL'y 9, II (2006); T. ALEXANDER ALEINIKOPF, SEMBLANCES OF SOVER-
EIGNTY: THE CONSTITUTION, THE STATE, AND AMERICAN CITIZENSHIP 174-75 (2002). Daniel 
Kanstroom captures the scope of constitutional deference with respect to the deportation 
system: 
Suppression of evidence that may have been seized in violation of the Fourth 
Amendment will be impossible in most cases. The noncitizen will not be read "Mi-
randa" rights. . . . If he believes he has been singled out due to race, religion, or 
political opinion, he will generally not be able to raise a "selective prosecution" 
defense. He will never have the right to a jury trial. If he has a formal hearing 
before an immigration judge, he will have certain due process rights: to be heard, to 
examine evidence, and to receive a written decision .... If he wants to appeal the 
immigration judge's decision, he may face incarceration during the length of that 
appeal-which could easily be years. He may then receive a summary decision 
made by a single member of the understaffed and overwhelmed Board of Immigra-
tion Appeals produced after a ten-minute review of his case. 
DANIEL KANSTROOM, DEPORTATION NATION: OUTSIDERS IN AMERICAN HISTORY 4 (2007). 
14 This liberalization includes, most notably, the abolition of national origins quotas in the 
Immigration and Nationality Act of \965, Pub. L. No. 89-236, 79 Stat. 911. 
IS See, e.g., NEUMAN, supra note 13, at 13 (describing the "immigration anomaly"); Lucy 
E. SALYER, LAWS HARSH AS TIGERS: CHINESE iMMIGRANTS AND THE SHAPING OF MODERN 
iMMIGRATION LAW 245 (1995) (observing that immigration is "alienate[d] ... from other 
branches of public law"); PETER H. SCHUCK, CITIZENS, STRANGERS, AND IN-BETWEENS: Es-
SAYS ON iMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP 19 (1998) (characterizing immigration as a legal 
"maverick" and "wild card"); Hiroshi Motomura, The Curious Evolution of Immigration 
Law: Procedural Surrogates for Substantive Constitutional Rights, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1625, 
1704 (1992) (noting the "singularity" of immigration). 
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ceptionalism-the long-standing and categorical equation of immigration 
regulation with the conduct of foreign affairs and national security. 
The existing scholarship on the origins of the plenary power doctrine 
does not account convincingly for either the Court's precipitous abandon-
ment in 1889 of its long-standing Commerce Clause framework or the re-
markable historical durability of the inherent sovereignty model. This 
explanatory deficit stems primarily from modern scholars' failure to appreci-
ate the enormous political and ideological stakes that immigration regulation 
carried for late nineteenth-century judges and policymakers. As a result, the 
scholarship consistently understates both the historical doctrinal importance 
and the cultural and political resonance of the "national security rationale" 
for immigration exceptionalism. 16 
16 The fact that the Court first endorsed the plenary power doctrine in the context of Chi-
nese exclusion, in an opinion notable for its explicit and sensational condemnation of the 
Chinese as a race, has led some leading commentators to suggest that the doctrine was 
animated primarily by the virulent anti-Chinese racism that pervaded late nineteenth-century 
American political culture. See, e.g., KANSTROOM, supra note 13, at 95-130; NEUMAN, supra 
note 13, at 119, 123-24; Stephen H. Legomsky, Immigration Law and the Principle of Plenary 
Congressional Power, 1984 SUP. CT. REV. 255, 289. Within this framework, the Court's invo-
cation in the Chinese Exclusion Case and elsewhere of Chinese laborers' "aggression" against 
the nation's "peace and security" reads either as racist hyperbole, or as an "analogy" to war 
wielded tactically by the Court in order to justify the same extraordinary judicial deference that 
Congress and the Executive enjoy with respect to foreign affairs and national security. See 
NEUMAN, supra note 13, at 136 (discussing the "analogy between immigration and invasion"). 
Although anti-Chinese sentiment was distinctive both in its intensity and its policy conse-
quences-specifically, the near-categorical exclusion of Chinese immigrants-the basic terms 
of that sentiment differed little from the racialist nativism directed at European immigrants 
during the same period. See infra notes 151-172 and accompanying text. 
Historian Lucy Salyer argues that Chinese immigrants' remarkably successful legal resis-
tance to the exclusion regime "provides a concrete explanation for the divergence of immigra-
tion law from other branches of administrative law." SALYER, supra note IS, at xvii. Salyer 
makes a persuasive case that federal judges' frustration over ineffective enforcement of the 
Chinese Exclusion Act triggered the Court's adoption of the plenary power doctrine. However, 
her account cannot explain why the national security rationale, and the broader principle of 
extra-constitutionality, were extended almost immediately to the regulation of European immi-
gration as well. 
Other leading scholars do recognize that the origins of immigration exceptional ism extend 
beyond Chinese exclusion to a broader late nineteenth-century critique of immigration. Sev-
eral important studies have pointed specifically to the surge of racialist nativism in the final 
decades of the nineteenth century to explain the triumph of "nationalistic, exclusionary val-
ues" over "the earlier individualistic ideology of traditional liberalism." SCHUCK, supra note 
15, at 48. See also ALEINIKOFF, supra note 13, at 26 (describing the construction of an "An-
glo-Saxon polity" in order to consolidate the "nationness of the United States"); ROGERS M. 
SMITH, CIVIC IDEALS: CONFLICTING VISIONS OF CITIZENSHIP IN U.S. HISTORY 347 (1997) 
(describing the "repudiation of Reconstruction egalitarian and inclusiveness" in favor of ine-
galitarian "ascriptivism"); Sarah H. Cleveland, Powers Inherent in Sovereignty: Indians, 
Aliens, Territories, and the Nineteenth Century Origins of Plenary Power Over Foreign Af-
fairs, 81 TEX. L. REv. I, 263 (2002) (maintaining that the "racist and nationalist views of the 
day go far in explaining the substantive outcomes reached in the inherent powers decisions"). 
Each of these works, however, employs an overly static model of race and racism that fore-
closes inquiry into the historical process through which the racial meaning ascribed to immi-
grants took shape. Interrogating that process enables us to better appreciate the underlying 
stakes of immigration regulation for the original architects of the plenary power doctrine, and 
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This Article instead places the national security rationale at the center 
of its historical analysis. I argue that the plenary power doctrine was borne 
of an urgent sense of national peril, the terms of which most contemporary 
policymakers, judges, and scholars would reject. The original, late nine-
teenth-century architects of the plenary power doctrine believed that un-
checked immigration had created a state of national emergency. In response, 
the Supreme Court fashioned an immigration power adapted not to the regu-
lation of labor, or economic dependency, or crime-issues that, then as now, 
characterize most immigration lawmaking-but rather to the defense of the 
nation against foreign aggression. In so doing, the Court radically trans-
formed the prevailing theory of national sovereignty from a domain of fed-
eral authority defined by specific, constitutionally enumerated powers, to 
one unmoored from the Constitution, "essential to self-preservation,"17 and 
reserved exclusively for "the political department of the government."18 
Although the modern federal immigration power made its judicial debut 
in the Chinese Exclusion Case,19 its historical origins in fact lie largely be-
yond Chinese exclusion, in a much broader contemporaneous critique of 
(mostly European) immigration. I argue that immigration exceptionalism is 
the product of a deep antagonism between the nation's republican political-
economic principles and the unprecedented social and economic dislocations 
wrought by the industrialization of the northern economy. For most of its 
history, the United States' relative liberality toward immigration was rooted 
in Americans' broad confidence that an open continent, easy access to land, 
and exposure to republican political values and institutions would assimilate 
all comers. Republicans were not born; rather, they were made. This confi-
dence underwrote a broad consensus, well into the post-Civil War era, that 
immigration was an invaluable economic asset to the nation, and that the 
vast majority of immigrants were desirable additions to the national polity. 
The problems associated with immigration-destitution, dependency on 
public support, crime, and disease-were generally understood to fit com-
fortably within the regulatory province of traditional state police authority 
and, by mid-century, federal commerce authority. During the first one hun-
dred years of the nation's history, the immigration power was thus defined 
fundamentally by reference to the specific purpose of the regulation at issue. 
State police authority reflected an understanding of immigrants primarily as 
individuals who may, like anyone else, be or become paupers or criminals; 
federal commerce authority likened immigrants to international commercial 
goods. In both cases, immigrants' foreignness per se was incidental, or at 
least secondary, to defining the power itself. 
to gain a richer, more historically accurate understanding of the national security rationale for 
immigration exceptionalism. 
17 Nishimura Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S. 651, 659 (1891). 
18Id. 
19 The Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. 581, 609 (1889). 
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In the last third of the nineteenth century, however, this vision collided 
with the economic and social realities of industrialization, including the de-
skilling of labor, the triumph of the wage system, increasingly intense wage 
competition, and the appearance of sustained widespread poverty in the na-
tion's cities. In response, contemporaries developed a diagnosis of the na-
tion's social and economic ills that centered less on these broad structural 
economic forces than on immigrants and immigration. A diverse range of 
policymakers, judges, labor spokesmen, and economists identified as the 
culprit a phenomenon that they called the "crisis of foreign pauper labor."20 
In contrast to "foreign paupers," whose economic dependency had long 
drawn the attention of state lawmakers and charity administrators, foreign 
pauper laborers offended through an excess of economic competitiveness. 
Their willingness to work for virtually any wage, critics charged, degraded 
the labor market, robbed "American" workers of a "civilized" standard of 
living, and threatened to destroy the very foundation of the nation's excep-
tionalist identity-the respectability, personal independence, and political 
virtue of the citizenry.21 The quality of American citizenship, and ultimately, 
the very future of the republic, appeared to lie in the balance. 
Critics of European and Chinese immigration alike routinely invoked 
the increasingly resonant logic of heredity and race. Pauper laborers' low 
standards of living, willingness to work for starvation wages, and inability to 
assimilate politically, they charged, were the product of their ingrained racial 
dispositions. Without the requisite economic conditions and racial material, 
critics argued, exposing immigrants to republican political culture held, by 
itself, little value as a force of assimilation. Contemporaries thus rei magi ned 
the American polity as a social and political body whose health depended 
less on the vitality of its political and economic values and institutions than 
on the collective natural endowments of its constituent members. In short, 
republicans were born, rather than made. Under this view, the future of the 
republic could be preserved only by repelling the foreign menace that 
threatened to degrade itY In response, the Supreme Court, in concert with 
Congress and a host of influential policy critics, forged the immigration 
power into an instrument of national self-defense, to be deployed against 
"invading armies" of politically unassimilable, economically degraded, and 
racially suspect foreign laborers. Though such immigrants were citizens of 
20 See infra Part U.A. 
21 At its core, nineteenth-century exceptionaIism consisted of a shared national confidence 
that the combination of unlimited natural resources, free labor, and republican political values 
of personal independence and virtuous citizenship would enable the United States to transcend 
the class conflict, political strife, and widespread poverty that had plagued the nations of Eu-
rope throughout the industrial era. On the "crisis in the national ideology of American excep-
tionalism," see DOROTHY Ross, THE ORIGINS OF AMERICAN SOCIAL SCIENCE 53 (1991). 
22 On the role of immigration regulation in mediating the conflict between the nation's 
republican ideals and the social and economic convulsions of the industrial era, see Matthew J. 
Lindsay, Preserving the Exceptional Republic: Political Economy, Race, and the Federaliza-
tion of American Immigration Law, 17 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 181, 182-86 (2005). 
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ostensibly "friendly" nations, policymakers and judges reimagined them as 
enemy aliens. The immigration power was thus redefined in relation to its 
objects, as immigrants' foreignness itself came to dictate the source, locus, 
and scope of Congress's regulatory authority. Through this process, the 
Court in effect invented the "immigrant" as a distinct, and distinctly conse-
quential, legal construct. 
Although the Supreme Court in recent decades has muted some of the 
more severe aspects of the plenary power doctrine,23 the constitutional ex-
ceptionalism of the immigration power, as well as its core legal rationale, 
remain fundamentally intact. As the passages quoted from the Kim decision 
indicate, the Court continues to define federal authority over immigration 
with reference to national sovereignty in matters of war, foreign affairs, and 
the preservation of republican govemment.24 It perpetuates the wholesale 
presumption that all laws regulating immigration are part and parcel of the 
conduct of national security, even though the social and political judgments 
that historically appeared to justify such a presumption-specifically, the 
Court's literal equation in the late nineteenth century between foreign pauper 
labor and foreign aggression-would strike most contemporary policymak-
ers and judges as anachronistic.25 
23 See Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 695 (2001) (holding that despite the "plenary" 
nature of legislative and executive power over immigration, "that power is subject to impor-
tant constitutional limitations"); Motomura, supra note 13, at 1628 (arguing that in recent 
decades "procedural due process has served in a significant number of cases as a 'surrogate' 
for the substantive judicial review that the plenary power doctrine seems to bar"); see also 
infra note 245. 
24 The executive branch, in particular, continues to stress the national security rationale for 
judicial deference toward immigration policymaking and enforcement. Cf infra note 240 
(describing rationales for judicial deference to both political branches in the immigration con-
text). Since the terrorist attacks of September II, 2001, the government has used its broad 
authority over immigration to selectively detain, and often deport, thousands of immigrants. 
Perhaps most strikingly, in 2002 the Department of Justice implemented the National Security 
Entry-Exit Registration System, requiring all nonimmigrant male aliens over sixteen years old 
from twenty-five predominantly Arab and Muslim countries to register with the INS within 
thirty days, and to report annually to an immigration officer. Registration of Certain Nonim-
migrant Aliens from Designated Countries, 67 Fed. Reg. 67,766 (Nov. 6, 2002). The govern-
ment never filed a criminal terrorism charge against any registrant, and after much criticism 
abandoned the program. See Hines, supra note 13, at 15-17. On the targeting of Arabs and 
Muslims within the U.S. since 9/11, see DAVID COLE, ENEMY ALIENS: DOUBLE STANDARDS 
AND CONSTITUTIONAL FREEDOMS IN THE WAR ON TERRORISM (2003). 
25 Readers familiar with the commentary of prominent contemporary immigration critics 
such as former CNN news broadcaster Lou Dobbs, commentator Patrick Buchanan, or Con-
gressman Tom Tancredo, among many others, may be skeptical of this claim. Dobbs, for 
example, routinely refers to an "illegal alien invasion" across the U.S. border with Mexico. 
See, e.g., Lou Dobbs Tonight (CNN television broadcast Mar. 21, 2005) (transcript available 
online at http://transcripts.cnn.com). And Buchanan, never one for subtlety, published a book 
in 2006 titled State of Emergency: The Third World Invasion and Conquest of America. First, 
such views, though no doubt shared by many Americans, do not represent majority opinion 
among policy elites or federal judges, as they did at the tum of the last century. Second, even 
most "mainstream" anti-illegal-immigration zealots generally do not claim that immigration 
per se poses an existential threat to the nation. Dobbs, for example, has suggested that he 
favors increasing legal immigration. See, e.g., Sam Stein, Book Exclusive: Lou Dobbs Said 
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Part I of this Article examines state and federal authority to regulate 
immigration in the half-century preceding the emergence of modern immi-
gration exceptionalism. It advances two propositions. First, early federal 
authority over immigration derived from Congress's constitutional power to 
regulate commerce with foreign nations. Second, mid-nineteenth-century 
judicial defenders of state regulation advocated dual theories of state author-
ity, grounded alternately in states' traditional police power, and states' status 
under international law as independent sovereigns endowed with an expan-
sive power of self-defense. The latter theory partially anticipated the inher-
ent congressional power framework embraced by the Supreme Court in the 
plenary power cases, but did so within a constitutionally circumscribed un-
derstanding of governmental sovereignty. Part II analyzes the creation of 
the modem federal immigration power as a form of authority "inherent in 
sovereignty and essential to seif-preservation,"26 and as such buffered 
against most judicially enforceable constitutional constraints. It argues that 
the historical key to modem immigration exceptionalism lies less in the nov-
elty of the Court's theory of inherent sovereignty, than in the broadly shared 
commitment to secure the nation against "invading armies" of "foreign pau-
per laborers." The Article concludes by arguing, in Part III, that by 
denaturalizing the national security rationale for immigration .exceptional-
ism, the historical analysis developed in Parts I and II functions as an histori-
cal critique of the contemporary immigration power. If the plenary power 
doctrine is to remain the governing framework for immigration regulation, I 
suggest, it should at the very least be supported by a legal rationale that 
today's policymakers and judges recognize as legitimate. 
I. BEFORE IMMIGRATION EXCEPTIONALISM: SOVEREIGNTY AND 
COMMERCE IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY 
There exists neither an explicit constitutional basis for a federal immi-
gration power nor any evidence that the Framers contemplated oneY In-
deed, in the half century preceding the Supreme Court's adoption of the 
plenary power doctrine in 1889, Supreme Court justices, legislators, and 
other commentators engaged in a protracted debate over the source, scope, 
and locus of the authority to regulate immigration. This Part advances two 
key propositions. First, in the middle decades of the nineteenth century, 
both advocates and critics of a robust federal immigration power understood 
congressional authority to regulate immigration to derive from the Com-
merce Clause. Second, judicial defenders of state authority simultaneously 
advocated two distinct theories. Their primary theory placed the regulation 
of immigration alongside the regulation of public health, safety, morals, and 
He'd Be Happy to Triple Number of Legal Immigrants, HUFFINGTON POST, May 28, 2008, 
http://www.huffingtonpost.coml2oo8/05/28Ibook-exc!usive-lou-dobbs_n_I03852.html. 
26 Nishimura Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S. 651, 659 (1891). 
27 See Cleveland, supra note 16, at 81-82. 
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welfare, under the general police power reserved to the states by the Consti-
tution and through which state and local governments regulated many as-
pects of public and commercial life throughout the nineteenth century. 
Crucially, the scope of such authority was defined with reference to the pur-
pose of the regulation at issue, rather than the foreignness of the persons 
upon whom the regulation acted. Their second theory of state authority 
imagined states as independent sovereigns, akin to nations and endowed by 
international law with the power to defend their citizenries against foreign 
encroachment. 
Although there is a considerable body of scholarship addressing the 
origins of the federal immigration power, most existing accounts either omit 
discussion of the antebellum cases,2s or alternatively interpret them as mere 
antecedents to the modern era of immigration exceptionalism.29 This Part 
proposes, by contrast, that the Court's development in the mid-nineteenth 
century of a theory of governmental sovereignty derived from international 
law and defined by the foreignness of its regulatory objects foreshadowed 
the theory of inherent federal sovereignty adopted decades later in the ple-
nary power cases.30 
A. "Free Immigration" in the Young Republic 
For nearly a century following the nation's founding, American immi-
gration policy reflected a deep faith among political leaders, judges, and 
other men of affairs that the health of the republic would be secured for all 
time by a vast, open frontier and robust constitutional democracy. The sin-
gular combination of limitless natural resources and republican institutions 
28 See. e.g .• ALEINIKOFF. supra note 13 (omitting discussion of the federal immigration 
power before the Chinese Exclusion Case); Legomsky, supra note 16 (same); Louis Henkin, 
The Constitution and United States Sovereignty: A Century of Chinese Exclusion and Its 
Progeny, 100 HARV. L. REv. 853,,855 (1987) (claiming that there was "little occasion" before 
the last third of the nineteenth century "to probe the sources of the federal power to control 
immigration and regulate aliens"). 
29 See, e.g., NEUMAN, supra note 13, at 44 (identifying in the mid-nineteenth-century cases 
a counter-story about state power, to the "usual narrative of immigration law history" as an 
inevitable march toward full federalization); Mary Sarah Bilder, The Struggle over Immigra-
tion: Indentured Servants. Slaves. and Articles of Commerce, 61 Mo. L. REV. 743, 751 (1996) 
(arguing that the Court was unable to reach consensus on the nature of Congress's commerce 
authority over immigration for most of the nineteenth century because the politics and legal 
culture of slavery prevented some Justices from accepting that immigrants could be "articles 
of commerce" for the purpose of Commerce Clause analysis). 
30 In her sweeping history of the nineteenth-century origins of Congress's plenary power 
over foreign affairs, Sarah Cleveland notes briefly that dissenting Justices in the Passenger 
Cases advanced arguments for state authority over immigration similar to those later embraced 
by the Court "in support of an inherent national immigration power." Cleveland, supra note 
16, at 105. Due to the remarkably ambitious scope of her study, however-it investigates the 
development of inherent congressional authority over not only immigration, but also Indian 
tribes and the territories-Cleveland cannot address in any detail the nineteenth-century pre-
cursors to modem immigration exceptionalism, including the state police power and interna-
tional law origins of the national "power of self-preservation." !d. (citing Smith v. Turner 
(The Passenger Cases), 48 U.S. 283, 470 (1849) (Taney, C.1., dissenting)). 
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would not only ensure the relative economic and political equality of its 
white, male, propertied citizens; it would spare the young nation the sys-
temic poverty, class conflict, political instability, and social decay that 
plagued Europe. Not least, it would literally transform all comers into re-
publican citizens.31 "[C]ontrary to European visions of degeneracy," writes 
the political scientist Aristide Zolberg, early Americans believed that "the 
American environment was imbued with regenerative powers verging on the 
miraculous . . . . Inclusion itself endowed newcomers with a republican 
soul."32 
This broad confidence in economic and political assimilation sustained 
a consensus well into the post-Civil War period that immigration was an 
invaluable national economic asset, and that the vast majority of immigrants 
were desirable additions to the American polity. As Carl Schurz, a leading 
light in the young Republican Party, explained to a Boston audience in 1859, 
the "American nationality" necessarily "incorporates the vigorous elements 
of all civilized nations on earth."33 Although Schurz granted that the "An-
glo-Saxon spirit" had served as the nation's traditional "locomotive of pro-
gress," he also maintained: 
31 See Lindsay, supra note 22, at 191-99. From the earliest years of the republic, Ameri-
can political elites developed a theory of cultural and political assimilation that placed enor-
mous stock in the power of political inclusiveness and easy access to land to transfonn 
foreigners into patriotic republicans. In 1787, Tench Coxe, a prominent political economist, 
\eading Federalist, and future Assistant Secretary of the Treasury under Alexander Hamilton, 
explained to a gathering at Benjamin Franklin's Philadelphia home the transfonnative power of 
American institutions: 
The sooner the new citizens are fully incorporated, with the society to which they 
accede, the sooner they become useful members; they then grow attached to their 
new country: they consider themselves as part of it: they adopt the opinions and 
affections of their new brethren, and soon forget they have adopted them, and imag-
ine they are natural. 
Tench Coxe, An Enquiry into the Best Means of Encouraging Emigration from Abroad, Con-
sistently with the Happiness and Safety of the Original Citizens (Apr. 20, 1787), in HISTORI-
CAL ASPECTS OF THE IMMIGRATION PROBLEM 706 (Edith Abbott ed., 1926). The 
assimilationist model of American citizenship remained more or less ascendant throughout the 
first two thirds of the nineteenth century. Missouri Congressman Willard Hall neatly encapsu-
lated the prevailing mid-century understanding of the transfonnative power of land and repub-
lican institutions: were the nation to "induce the foreign immigrant to make his home in the 
West" by providing easy access to land, Hall argued, it would 
secure his attachment and fidelity to our institutions. As soon as he finds himself in 
possession of a home of his own, and occupying a position that makes him a free 
man-free from the control, direction, and oppression of a superior, he will and must 
feel proud of his American citizenship ... and his study will be to discharge all the 
duties of a good and faithful citizen ... . 
CONGo GLOBE, 32nd Cong., 1st Sess. 438 (1852), reprinted in HISTORICAL ASPECTS OF THE 
IMMIGRATION PROBLEM 780 (Edith Abbott, ed., 1926). 
32 ARlSTIDE R. ZOLBERG, A NATION BY DESIGN: IMMIGRATION POLICY IN THE FASHIONING 
OF AMERICA 84 (2006). 
33 Carl Schurz, True Americanism, Address at Faneuil Hall (Apr. 18, 1859), in IMMIGRA-
TION AND THE AMERICAN TRADmoN 121, 121 (Moses Rischin ed., 1976). 
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[T]his locomotive would be of little use to the world if it refused 
to draw its train over the iron highway and carry its valuable 
freight towards its destination; that train consists of the vigorous 
elements of all nations; that freight is the vital ideas of our age; 
that destination is universal freedom and the ideal development of 
man. 34 
In Schurz's vision, economic development fueled by immigrant labor strode 
aside political freedom in the great march of human progress. 
This worldview directly shaped the regulation of immigration-or, 
more specifically, the relative lack of regulation-during the nation's first 
century. Before the 1870s, the national government never acted to exclude 
any class of immigrants, and the only two federal regulations adopted during 
that period-the Passenger Acts of 181935 and 184736-were directed toward 
improving the conditions of passage by reducing the number of passengers 
per ship. Nor was the spirit of welcome limited to Europeans. As late as 
1868-a mere fourteen years before Congress adopted the first Chinese Ex-
clusion Act-the United States and China entered into the Burlingame 
Treaty, pledging to afford each other's citizens the same privileges and im-
munities as citizens of the most favored nation, and affirming "the inherent 
and inalienable right of man to change his home and allegiance, and also the 
mutual advantage of the free migration and emigration of their citizens and 
subjects . . . . "37 
To be sure, neither Americans' support for liberal immigration, nor their 
confidence in the assimilability of all immigrants went unchallenged. Anti-
immigrant sentiment directed at a recent influx of Irish (especially Catholic) 
immigrants spiked in the 1850s, fueling the brief electoral success of the 
nativist Know Nothing Party. And while the United States certainly valued 
Chinese immigrants for their labor, political inclusion was another matter. 
Chinese immigrants remained ineligible for naturalization throughout the 
nineteenth century and the first half of the twentieth.38 In addition, while the 
34 /d. at 123-24. 
35 Steerage Act of March 2, 1819, ch. 46, 3 Stat. 488. 
36 Passenger Act of Feb. 22, 1847, ch. 16,9 Stat. 127 (repealed 1855). 
37 Treaty of Trade, Consuls, and Emigration, U.S.-China, July 28, 1868, 16 Stat. 739, 740 
[hereinafter Burlingame Treaty]. That same year, the Expatriation Act linked this right of free 
migration to the fTnited States' general policy of welcoming immigrants: "[T]he right of 
expatriation is a natural and inherent right of all people, indispensable to the enjoyment of the 
rights of life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness; and ... in the recognition of this principle 
this government has freely received emigrants from all nations, and invested them with the 
rights of citizenship .... " Expatriation Act of July 27, 1868, ch. 249, 15 Stat. 223, 223. 
38 The Naturalization Act of 1790 restricted naturalization to "free white persons." Natu-
ralization Act of 1790, ch. 3, I Stat. 103, 103. Chinese and other nonnative born "asiatics" 
were excluded from American citizenship until the Immigration Act of 1952 lifted the racial 
ban. As Reginald Horsman demonstrates, by the middle decades of the nineteenth century, 
there existed general skepticism regarding the suitability of nonwhite "races"-including 
Mexicans in the southwest and Native Americans throughout the continent, as well as African 
Americans and Chinese immigrants-for republican government. See generally REGINALD 
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Passenger Acts certainly improved the welfare of immigrants, the Con-
gresses that enacted those statutes clearly hoped and expected that the mea-
sures they implemented would also check the flow of immigration during 
economic downturns.39 Notwithstanding such reservations, however, the 
problems associated with immigration-destitution, dependence on public 
support, crime, disease, and prostitution-were broadly viewed as excep-
tions to an overwhelmingly beneficial policy of liberality. 
Most importantly for regulatory purposes, those problems were under-
stood as local and discrete. As such, they fit comfortably within the prov-
ince of traditional state police authority, under which nineteenth-century 
states and municipalities regulated all aspects of public health, safety, 
morals, and welfare.40 And indeed, throughout the first two thirds of the 
nineteenth century, the seaboard states, rather than the federal government, 
exercised primary authority over the landing of immigrants. For example, 
the state of New York-which in the mid-nineteenth century received about 
three quarters of the nation's immigrants--exacted from each immigrant a 
head tax, which it used to fund a refuge and hospital for newly landed immi-
grants, facilitate transportation to the interior, and even supply the most des-
titute immigrants with a small amount of money. Such regulations were 
designed and administered as much to encourage immigrants' economic in-
dependence and to protect them from the vice and deceit that was said to 
plague American port cities, as to defend the states receiving them against 
the burden of impoverished or criminal foreigners. 41 
B. Police vs. Commerce 
The mid-nineteenth century debate over the source, nature, and locus of 
governmental authority to regulate immigration unfolded in two landmark 
Supreme Court cases-City of New York v. Miln42 and the Passenger 
Cases. 43 This Section establishes, first, that virtually all of the participants in 
these cases-litigants and judges alike-acknowledged that federal author-
ity over immigration derived from Congress's constitutionally enumerated 
commerce power. Second, it demonstrates that a states-rights bloc of jus-
tices mounted two distinct defenses of the states' authority to regulate immi-
gration. The primary defense centered on the states' traditional police 
power, the scope of which was defined by the purpose of the regulation at 
HORSMAN, RACE AND MANIFEST DESTINY: THE ORIGINS OF AMERICAN RACIAL ANGLO-SAX-
ONISM 5-6 (1981). 
39 On the Passenger Acts of 1819 and 1847 as a form of "remote control" motivated by 
restrictionist impulses, see ZOLBERG, supra note 32, at 112-15, 145-48. 
40 On the pervasiveness of police regulations in the nineteenth-century United States and 
the reigning theory and practice of a "well-regulated society," see WILLIAM 1. NOVAK, THE 
PEOPLE'S WELFARE: LAW AND REGULATION IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA (1996). 
41 See Lindsay, supra note 22, at 198-200. 
42 36 U.S. 102 (1837). 
43 48 U.S. 283 (1849). 
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issue. The justices supplemented this defense with a second, more histori-
cally prescient theory of state authority that imagined states as independent 
sovereigns endowed by intemationallaw with the power of self-defense, and 
that depended explicitly on immigrants' status as noncitizens.44 These jus-
tices in effect invented the "immigrant" as a distinct, and distinctly conse-
quential, legal construct. 
The federalization of immigration lawmaking between the first federal 
Passenger Act in 1819 and Congress's assumption of full administrative con-
trol over the landing of immigrants in 1891 was deeply embedded in two 
epochal historical dynamics: slavery and emancipation, and the industriali-
zation of labor. First, the debate among the justices over the authority to 
regulate immigration unfolded in the shadow of sectional political conflict 
over slavery. Pro-slavery states' rights advocates denied that immigrants 
could be "articles of commerce" because this view implied that Congress 
might also possess the constitutional authority to regulate other human arti-
cles of commerce-namely slaves.45 Second, the federalization of immigra-
tion regulation was shaped by a wholesale political and cultural 
reconstruction of adult male economic dependency. In response to a host of 
economic and social dislocations associated with the industrial reorganiza-
tion of labor, nineteenth-century Americans reconceived "pauperism" from 
an individual moral failing, the burden of which was appropriately borne by 
states and municipalities, to an intractable quality of "unfit" nationalities 
and races that had overflowed the bounds of locality to pose a fundamental 
challenge to the nation's most cherished political and economic values.46 
1. City of New York v. Miln 
The Supreme Court first addressed the power to regulate immigration, 
and attempted to define the states' and the federal government's respective 
spheres of authority, in the 1837 case of City of New York v. MilnY The 
case involved a challenge to an 1824 New York State law requiring the 
master of every vessel arriving in the Port of New York to report in writing 
44 This interpretation thus complicates the suggestion of some scholars that the sover-
eignty rationale embraced by the Supreme Court in the Chinese Exclusion Case was the criti-
cal doctrinal innovation that ushered in the modem era of immigration exceptional ism. See, 
e.g., ALEINIKOFF, supra note 13, at 12-18; Henkin, supra note 28, at 853-54. 
45 See Bilder, supra note 29, at 793-818. 
46 Part II.A, infra, describes this transformation in greater detail. In brief, in the final two 
decades of the nineteenth century, the problem of "foreign pauper labor" captivated policy-
makers and economists alike. Unlike "foreign paupers," whose economic dependency had 
long drawn the ire and regulatory attention of lawmakers, foreign pauper laborers offended 
through an excess of economic competitiveness. Through their willingness to work for virtu-
ally any wage, critics charged, foreign pauper laborers robbed "American" workers of the 
income required to secure for their families a "civilized" standard of living, thereby not only 
degrading the labor market, but threatening to destroy the very fabric of the republic-the 
respectability, personal independence, and political virtue of the citizenry. See also Lindsay, 
supra note 22, at 220-23. 
47 36 U.S. 102 (1837). 
2010] Immigration as Invasion 15 
the name, birthplace, last legal settlement, age, and occupation of every pas-
senger.48 George Miln, a shipmaster convicted of violating the reporting re-
quirement, charged that the provision was an unconstitutional regulation of 
foreign commerce by a state and therefore void. The Court rejected the chal-
lenge, holding that the law was not a regulation of commerce; that even if it 
could be thus understood, it nevertheless was valid because it did not inter-
fere with an act of Congress; and finally, that states exercised unlimited 
jurisdiction within their territory, comparable to that of an independent 
nation. 
Tellingly, both parties and all of the justices in Miln agreed that the 
commerce power afforded Congress some measure of authority to regulate 
immigration. Thirteen years earlier, in Gibbons v. Ogden,49 the Court had 
established that Congress's power to regulate commerce with foreign nations 
or among the several states encompassed "navigation," irrespective of 
whether the object of such navigation was the transportation of goods or of 
persons. 50 In Miln, counsel for New York conceded that the Commerce 
Clause afforded Congress supreme power over the transit of foreign passen-
gers to the United States. The legal conflict instead centered on the scope 
and nature of authority retained by New York. To the extent that the report-
ing requirement was a "commercial regulation," the state acknowledged, it 
would be invalid if it were found to conflict with an act of Congress.51 The 
Court agreed that a state regulation of immigration "partaking of the nature 
of a commercial regulation ... would stand the test of the most rigid scru-
tiny .... "52 
Justice Barbour's majority opinion53 concluded that, by virtue of the 
act's purpose and object, it was "not a regulation of commerce, but of police; 
and [thus] ... passed in the exercise of a power rightfully belonging to the 
states."54 The "whole scope of the law," the Court explained, indicated that 
the legislature's purpose was "to prevent New York from being burdened by 
an influx of persons ... chargeable as paupers."55 Because goods, and not 
persons, are the subjects of commerce, Congress's commerce power did not 
encompass the reporting requirement.56 Even if the challenged provision 
"could be considered as partaking of the nature of a commercial regulation," 
it remained within the authority of the state so long as it avoided a direct 
48 {d. at 130. 
49 22 U.S. 1 (1824). 
50 {d. at 197. 
51 Miln, 36 U.S. at 127. 
52 {d. at 139. 
53 In the Passenger Cases, decided twelve years after Miln, Justice Wayne refuted at 
length Barbour's claim in Miln to have written for a majority of the Court. See The Passenger 
Cases, 48 U.S. 283,429-36 (1849) (Wayne, J., concurring). 
54 Miln, 36 U.S. at 132. 
55 {d. at 133. 
56 See Bilder, supra note 29, at 751, 793-818. 
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"collision" with the will of CongressY The most recent expression of na-
tional policy-the Passenger Act of 1819-acted on passengers only "whilst 
on their voyage, and until they shall have landed," the Court explained. Be-
cause New York's reporting requirement applied to passengers who had al-
ready landed-that is, who "have ceased to be passengers" -the law's 
"operation only begins where that of the laws of congress end."58 The fact 
that the persons who were the objects of the regulation were recently landed 
aliens was merely incidental to the state's authority to enact the law. 
The majority then added a decidedly outward-looking gloss on the 
state's power of internal police. The Court's decision turned not only on its 
specific resolution of the boundary dispute between Congress's commerce 
authority and the police power of the state, but also on New York's status as 
an independent sovereign under the law of nations. The Court reasoned that 
with respect to aliens, states were, like nations, endowed by international 
law with the absolute power to defend their territorial integrity against for-
eign encroachment. In support of this theory, the Court advanced a series of 
"impregnable positions": 
That a state has the same undeniable and unlimited jurisdiction 
over all persons and things, within its territorial limits, as any for-
eign nation; where that jurisdiction is not surrendered or restrained 
by the constitution of the United States. That, by virtue of this, it 
is ... [the] solemn duty of a state, to advance the safety, happi-
ness and prosperity of its people, and to provide for its general 
welfare ... where the power over the particular subject, or the 
manner of its exercise is not surrendered or restrained .... That all 
those powers which relate to merely municipal legislation, or what 
may ... properly be called internal police, are not thus surren-
dered or restrained; and that, consequently, in relation to these, the 
authority of a state is complete, unqualified, and exclusive. 59 
New York's authority to adopt the challenged reporting requirement, the 
Court suggested, lay in its duty to defend the citizenry against an external 
threat. As the nation's principle port of entry, New York was "exposed to 
the evil of thousands of foreign emigrants arriving there, and the consequent 
danger of her citizens being subjected to a heavy charge in the maintenance 
of those who are pOOr."60 "It is the duty of the state to protect its citizens 
from this evil," the Court declared. 61 Notwithstanding the Court's decision 
57 Miln, 36 u.s. at 138. The Court further suggested that even cotenninous state and 
federal regulations may not qualify as a true "collision," insofar as such regulations may be 
"scarcely ... distinguishable" from one another yet still "flow from distinct powers." [d. at 
137. 
58 [d. at 138. 
59/d. at 139. 
60 [d. at 141. 
61 [d. 
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to cast New York's authority specifically in terms of its power to repel an 
external threat, as well as its invocation of international law as a source of 
such authority, the scope of the state's power remained confined to matters 
"relat[ed] to merely municipal legislation."62 
To explain the "origin and character of this power," the Court invoked 
not the text of the Constitution or the history of the United States' founding, 
but the law of nations.63 By way of illustrating the "truism" that New York 
"possessed the power to pass this law before the adoption of the constitution 
of the United States," Justice Barbour turned to the international law author-
ity Emer de Vattel.64 Vattel explained: "The sovereign may forbid the en-
trance of his territory, either to foreigners in general, or in particular cases, 
or to certain persons, or for certain reasons, according as he may think it 
advantageous to the state."65 This passage, from Vattel's 1758 treatise, The 
Law of Nations or the Principles of International Law, would become a 
favorite of jurists concerned about federal usurpation of state police author-
ity. Justice Barbour's opinion in Miln thus embraces a naturalistic theory of 
governmental sovereignty derived from international law. "There can be no 
mode in which the power to regulate internal police could be more appropri-
ately exercised," the Court concluded, than protecting the state's citizens 
against oppression by foreign paupers.66 This was a power that was both 
"complete, unqualified, and exclusive"-or "plenary," in the ordinary legal 
sense of that term-yet restrained in scope by the U.S. Constitution.67 
2. The Passenger Cases 
The relative authority of the states and the federal government to regu-
late immigration, as well as the nature of the "sovereignty" from which such 
authority flowed, received its fullest elaboration in the 1849 Passenger 
Cases.68 The case consolidated challenges to New York and Massachusetts 
laws, each requiring the master of every vessel arriving from a foreign port 
to pay a modest head tax for each passenger, to be used to fund a marine 
hospital and to support "foreign paupers," respectively.69 In a decision con-
sisting of eight separate opinions totaling nearly 300 pages, the Court held 
that the taxes were an unconstitutional regulation of foreign commerce. 
Four members of the five-justice majority struck down the head taxes 
on the ground that the provisions directly collided with the will of Con-
62 [d. at 137. See supra text accompanying note 59. 
63 [d. at 132. 
64 [d. 
65 [d. The Court continued, "Since the lord of the territory may, whenever he thinks 
proper, forbid its being entered, he has, no doubt, a power to annex what conditions he pleases, 
to the permission to enter." [d. 
66 [d. at 141. 
67 See supra note 6. 
68 48 U.S. 283 (1849). 
69 [d. at 286. 
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gress.70 They interpreted the relative absence of federal regulation as an ex-
pression of Congress's affirmative policy of promoting "free immigration," 
rather than, as the dissenters argued, either a reflection of congressional in-
difference or an invitation to the states to legislate. "From the first day of 
our [nation's] separate existence," Justice Catron reasoned, "has the policy 
of drawing hither aliens, to the end of becoming citizens, been a favorite 
policy of the United States, ... cherished by Congress with rare steadiness 
and vigor."71 No single state, he concluded, can "claim the power of thwart-
ing by its own authority the established policy of all the States united."72 
The challenged regulations exceeded the bounds of state authority pre-
cisely because they encompassed persons who posed no threat to public 
health, morals, or welfare. The justices pointed specifically to the failure of 
the New York and Massachusetts taxes to discriminate between would-be 
dependents, on the one hand, and the vast majority of immigrants whose 
settlement the United States sought to encourage, on the other. The majority 
judged "fallacious" the states' argument that because a state may exclude 
paupers and lunatics under its police power, "therefore she may exclude all 
persons, whether they come within this category or not."73 "[S]he may ex-
7°ld. at 410-64 (concurring opinions of Wayne, Catron, McKinley, and Grier, 11.). The 
fifth member, Justice McLean, insisted that because the Constitution vested the authority to 
regulate foreign commerce exclusively with Congress, it thereby also prohibited any and all 
state regulation touching on the subject. See id. at 392-410. 
71 Id. at 440. This interpretation of the relative scarcity of federal regulation, in tum, 
reflected each justice's assessment of the actual economic and political virtues of immigration, 
read through the lens of his republican worldview. As Catron noted, through the national 
policy of liberal immigration "our extensive and fertile country has been ... filled up by a 
respectable population ... that is easily governed and usually of approved patriotism." Id. In 
light of its material benefit, and "[k]eeping in view the spirit of the Declaration of Indepen-
dence with respect to the importance of augmenting the population of the United States," 
Congress had frequently passed laws "to facilitate and encourage more and more the immigra-
tion of Europeans into the United States for the purpose of settlement and residence." Id. 
After reviewing various federal reporting requirements and other provisions enacted for the 
benefit of immigrants, Catron observed: 
It is evident that, by these repeated and well-considered acts of legislation, Congress 
has covered, and has intended to cover, the whole field of legislation over this 
branch of commerce. [A]cting in the spirit of all our history and all our policy, it 
has opened the door widely and invited the subjects of other countries to leave the 
crowded population of Europe and come to the United States. 
Id. at 442. 
72 /d. at 443. Justice Grier similarly reasoned: 
The United States have, within and beyond the limits of these States, many millions 
of acres of vacant lands. It is the cherished policy of the general government to 
encourage and invite Christian foreigners of our own race to seek an asylum within 
our borders, and to convert these waste lands into productive farms, and thus add to 
the wealth, popUlation, and power of the nation. Is it possible that the framers of our 
Constitution have committed such an oversight, as to leave it to the discretion of 
some two or three States to thwart the policy of the Union, and dictate the terms 
upon which foreigners shall be permitted to gain access to the other States? 
Id. at 461 (Grier, J., concurring). 
73 Id. at 463 (Grier, J., concurring). 
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clude putrid and pestilential goods from being landed on her shores," Justice 
Grier explained, "yet it does not follow that she may prescribe what sound 
goods may be landed, or prohibit their importation altogether."74 Indeed, 
"[t]he powers used for self-defence [sic] and protection against harm can-
not be perverted into weapons of offence [sic] and aggression upon the 
rights of others. "75 The importance of discriminating between immigrants 
who were fit for republican political and economic institutions and those 
destined to lives of pauperism and dependency would gain even greater sali-
ence in the 1870s. As Justice Grier's analysis suggests, that distinction was 
already taking on constitutional meaning as the Court struggled to define the 
boundary between commerce and police, national and local. Just as the reg-
ulation of healthy, desirable immigrants lay beyond the police power of the 
states, Justice Wayne explained, "[p]aupers, vagabonds and fugitives never 
have been subjects of rightful national intercourse, or of commercial regula-
tions .... "76 
All of the justices in the Passenger Cases, including the four dissenters, 
agreed that federal authority to regulate immigration derived from Con-
gress's constitutional power to regulate commerce. For the majority, how-
ever, and particularly for Justice Wayne, the Commerce Clause was more 
than the formal, constitutionally enumerated locus of the federal immigra-
tion power. It was equivalent to national sovereignty itself. Just as the Miln 
Court had invoked the law of nations to define the nature and scope of New 
York's territorial authority, so did Wayne in the Passenger Cases view fed-
eral sovereignty through the lens of eighteenth-century international law. In 
light of the framers' familiarity with "the many valuable works upon trade 
and international law," he wrote, such knowledge "may well be invoked to 
measure the constitutional power of Congress to regulate commerce."77 
Wayne quoted Georg Friedrich de Martens' 1789 treatise, Law of Nations, 
explaining that such a power included the nation's right "to exercise freely 
its sovereign power over the foreigners living in its territories."78 The states' 
"erroneous proposition" that they possess "unlimited discretion ... to deter-
mine what persons shall reside in it," Wayne continued, arose from their 
failure to recognize that "a part of the supreme police power of a nation is 
identical ... with its sovereignty over commerce. Or, more properly speak-
ing, the regulation of commerce is one of those particular rights collectively 
placed in the hands of the sovereign for the good of the State."79 
While supporters of a robust (if dormant) federal commerce power pre-
vailed in the Passenger Cases, in important respects the three dissenting 
74 [d. 
75 [d. 
76 [d. at 426 (Wayne, J., concurring). 
77 [d. at 416. 
78 [d. (citing GEORG FRIEDRICH DE MARTENS, SUMMARY OF THE LAW OF NATIONS (Wil-
liam Cobbett trans., Thomas Bradford 1795) (1789)). 
79 [d. at 427. 
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opinions-by Chief Justice Taney and Justices Daniel and Woodbury-were 
more prescient about the future of the evolving federal immigration power. 
The dissenters viewed the majority's decision as an illegitimate extension of 
congressional authority into the traditional, sovereign domain of state police 
power. The consequence, they warned, was to deny the states their rightful 
"power of self-preservation"8o against an encroaching European "mass of 
pauperism and vice."81 In response, they elaborated an ambitious account of 
powers inherent in state sovereignty over immigration that, paradoxically, 
foreshadowed a theory of federal sovereignty more absolute and exclusive 
than any of the participants in the Passenger Cases could have imagined. 
The dissenters advanced two distinct but interconnected propositions. 
First, they argued that the challenged statutes were textbook examples of 
traditional state police authority. They pleaded for a bright line of demarca-
tion between what they considered essentially local matters of internal police 
and the wholly separate federal domain of commerce-a line, they urged, 
that should be drawn according to the regulatory purpose of the provision. 
The purpose of the challenged head taxes, explained Justice Woodbury, was 
to indemnify the states "against the ruinous burdens which would otherwise 
be flung upon them by the incursions of paupers from abroad .... "82 Like' 
most mid-century Americans, the dissenters understood economic depen-
dency as a quintessentially local issue. Because the challenged head taxes 
were "part of the pauper laws of the State,"83 the Chief Justice argued, they 
lay at the heart of the states' police power. Some subjects of legislation 
exhibit an "amphibious character," Justice Woodbury acknowledged, and 
were thus susceptible to classification variably as matters of police, taxation, 
or commerce.84 By contrast, "[t]hese affairs are a part of the domestic 
economy of States, belong to their interior policy, and operate on matters 
affecting the fireside, the hearth, and the altar."85 "The design is local; the 
80 [d. at 470 (Taney, C.J., dissenting). 
81 [d. at 472. 
82 [d. at 518 (Woodbury, J., dissenting). As Woodbury's statement suggests, the dissenters' 
perspective on immigration was markedly darker than the republican "free immigration" val-
ues of the majority. Taney worried that foreign shipmasters, perhaps acting "under the influ-
ence of foreign governments ... and having no common interest or sympathy with the people 
of the United States, ... may be far more disposed to bring away the worst and most danger-
ous portion of the population rather than the moral and industrious citizen." [d. at 471 (Taney, 
C.J., dissenting). As a consequence of the majority's decision, he continued, "this mass of 
pauperism and vice may be poured out upon the shores of a State in opposition to its laws, and 
the State authorities are not permitted to resist or prevent it." [d. at 472. The result would be 
to "impose upon the industry of its citizens, the duty of supporting the immense mass of 
poverty and helplessness which is now pressing so heavily upon property in Europe, and 
which it is endeavouring to throw off." [d. at 490. By denying states the capacity to "create a 
fund for the support of alien paupers," the majority had thus "compel [led] the several States 
to receive, and suffer to remain in association with its citizens, every person or class of persons 
whom it may be the policy of pleasure of the U.S. to admit." [d. at 465. 
83 [d. at 465 (Taney, C.J., dissenting). 
84 [d. at 545 (Woodbury, J., dissenting). 
85 [d. at 550-51. 
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object a State object, and not a foreign or commercial one,"86 he explained. 
In marked contrast to the nationalization of "foreign pauperism" as an eco-
nomic and political problem in the last third of the nineteenth century,87 
Woodbury saw "nothing in the nature of much which is here connected with 
foreign commerce that is in its character foreign, or appropriate for the ac-
tion of a central and single government."88 For the Passenger Cases dissent-
ers, as for the Miln majority, the regulatory purpose of the law was essential, 
and the purpose was not immigration per se, but pauperism. The fact that 
the challenged taxes applied to immigrants qua immigrants was only inci-
dental to their conceptual bifurcation of police from commerce, and state 
from federal. 
The relative paucity of federal regulation touching on immigration rep-
resented not an affirmative expression of Congress's historical policy of pro-
moting free immigration, as the majority had claimed, but rather an 
endorsement of immigration localism. Congress's "silence" with respect to 
"any mere local or subordinate matter within the limits of a State, though 
connected in some respects with foreign commerce," Woodbury insisted, did 
not "nullify[] and destroy[]" state authority.89 Rather, congressional si-
lence is "an invitation for the States to legislate ... leaving it to them for the 
present, and assenting to their action in the matter .... "90 
The dissenters also advanced a second, more ambitious claim of state 
authority that was rooted in the law of nations, and which depended explic-
itly on immigrants' status as aliens. Specifically, they extended the Miln 
majority's theory that states, "as perfect original sovereignties," possessed a 
"right of self-preservation" encompassing the exclusion, regulation, or re-
moval of aliens.91 Unlike in Miln, where the international law rationale 
served principally as gloss on, or supplement to, the state's traditional police 
power, in the Passenger Cases dissents it appears to operate as an indepen-
dent source of state regulatory authority over immigration. Invoking Vattel, 
Woodbury explained that the right of sovereign states to prescribe the terms 
by which aliens may enter or remain within their territory, or to exclude 
them entirely, "finds vindication in the principles of public law the world 
over. "92 Nor was such a power contingent on the condition of the aliens 
taxed or excluded: 
Those corning may be voluntary emigrants from other nations, or 
traveling absentees, or refugees in revolutions, party exiles, com-
pulsory victims of power, or they may consist of cargoes of shack-
led slaves, or large bands of convicts, or brigands, or persons with 
86 Id. at 548. 
87 See infra Part II.A. 
88 The Passenger Cases, 48 U.S. at 557 (Woodbury, J., dissenting). 
891d. at 560. 
90ld. 
9lld. at 514 (Daniel, J., dissenting). 
92 Id. at 525 (Woodbury, J., dissenting). 
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incendiary purposes, or imbecile paupers, or those suffering from 
infectious diseases, or fanatics with principles and designs more 
dangerous than either, or under circumstances of great ignorances, 
as liberated serfs, likely at once ... to make them a serious burden 
in their support as paupers, and a contamination of public morals. 
There can be no doubt, on principles of national law, of the right to 
prevent the entry of these, either absolutely or on such conditions 
as the State may deem prudent to impose.93 
In contrast to the majority's rendering of the states' police power, powers 
inhering in state sovereignty need not discriminate between desirable "vol-
untary" immigrants, on the one hand, and diseased "imbecile paupers," on 
the other. Sovereign power was predicated on neither the purpose of the 
regulation, nor the condition of its objects. It derived, instead, from their 
foreignness. 
The dissenters coupled this affirmative account of state sovereignty 
with a pointed critique of "the alleged right of Congress to regulate exclu-
sively the admission of aliens."94 "Over aliens, qua aliens," Justice Daniel 
accurately noted, "no direct authority has been delegated to Congress by the 
Constitution."95 Daniel took issue particularly with the supposition that 
Congress possessed such authority under the law of nations, or under its 
delegated powers to make war or repel invasion. He did so, moreover, in 
terms that foreshadow with remarkable prescience the functional collapse 
forty years later of the distinction between alien friends and alien enemies.96 
"[U]nder the law of nations," he wrote, "aliens are responsible only for 
national offences [sic],-offences [sic] in which their nation bears a pan, 
they are then alien enernies."97 Similarly, "alien friends could not be the 
subjects of war ... nor in any sense instruments of a hostile invasion, such 
invasion being an operation of war."98 As will become clear in Part I1.B, 
Daniel's critique applies with equal or greater force to the Court's adoption in 
the Chinese Exclusion Case and its progeny of a federal immigration power 
"inherent in sovereignty and essential to self-preservation."99 
93 Id. Chief Justice Taney similarly rejected the relevance to state sovereignty of any dis-
tinction between different "classes" of alien. There was "no provision in the Constitution of 
the United States which makes any distinction between different descriptions of aliens, or 
which reserves the power to the State as to one class and denies it over the other," he insisted. 
Further, the Supreme Court was "utterly incapable" of so discriminating. Taney queried: 
"How could [the Court] ascertain what had been the pursuits, habits, and mode of life of 
every emigrant, and how far he was liable to lose his health, and become, with a helpless 
family, a charge upon the citizens of the State?" Id. at 469 (Taney, C.J., dissenting). 
941d. at 509 (Daniel, J., dissenting). 
951d. 
96 See infra text accompanying notes 201-202. 
97 The Passenger Cases, 48 U.S. at 510 (Daniel, J., dissenting). 
981d. 
99 Nishimura Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S. 651, 659 (1891). For the dissenters, in par-
ticular, the politics of race and slavery loomed large, as the scope of the federal commerce 
power directly implicated the ability of states to regulate the entry into their territory of slaves 
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C. The Federalization of the Immigration Power 
Congress and the Supreme Court federalized the immigration power in 
tandem. Between 1875 and 1891, Congress enacted a series of statutes 
wresting immigration policymaking, and then administrative control, from 
the states. 100 The Court responded in turn by striking down a number of 
existing state regulations and upholding the new federal legislation. In the 
two decades preceding the Court's adoption of the plenary power doctrine, 
the Justices reached unanimous consensus that the transportation of immi-
grants to the United States constituted commerce with foreign nations, and 
accordingly, that Congress alone was constitutionally empowered to regulate 
that process. This was a form of congressional authority, moreover, that 
seemed to accommodate not only legislation that was explicitly commercial 
in nature, but also police-like regulations of the sort formerly reserved to the 
states, as well as the administration of foreign affairs. Notwithstanding its 
expansive scope, however, the federal immigration power of the 1870s and 
1880s remained a creature of and subject to the U.S. Constitution. Finally, 
with the ascendancy of the commerce framework in the 1870s and 1880s, 
the foreignness of immigrants' origins took on added meaning. Immigrants 
constituted articles of commerce with foreign nations precisely because they 
were transported to the United States from abroad. In contrast to the plenary 
power era, however, under the commerce framework it was the economic 
importance of immigration to the nation rather than the noncitizenship of 
immigrants themselves that dictated the nature and scope of congressional 
authority. 
and free blacks. If the federal commerce power were exclusive of state regulations such as the 
challenged head taxes, Woodbury explained, "all the laws of Ohio, Mississippi, and many 
other States, either forbidding or taxing the entrance of slaves or liberated blacks, will be 
nullified .... " The Passenger Cases, 48 U.S. at 567 (Woodbury, J., dissenting). Chief Justice 
Taney, who eight years later penned the majority opinion in Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 
393 (1856), similarly worried that if the federal government could oblige states to receive 
immigrants, then "emancipated slaves of the West Indies have at this hour the absolute right to 
reside, hire houses, and traffic and trade throughout the Southern States, in spite of any State 
law to the contrary; inevitably producing the most serious discontent, and ultimately leading to 
the most painful consequences." The Passenger Cases, 48 U.S. at 474 (Taney, C.J., dissent-
ing). See generally Bilder, supra note 29, passim. 
100 See Immigration Act of 1891, § 7, ch. 551, 26 Stat. 1084 (codified as amended at 8 
U.S.c. §§ 1551-74 (2006» (transferring sole authority to administer immigration regulations 
to the federal government, and creating the office of the Superintendent of Immigration under 
the authority of the Secretary of the Treasury); Contract Labor Act of 1885, chs. 161-64,23 
Stat. 332 (repealed 1952) (prohibiting the immigration of any foreigner who had entered into 
an employment contract with an American employer prior to departing his country of origin); 
Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882, ch. 126, 22 Stat. 58 (repealed 1943) (prohibiting the entry of 
Chinese laborers into the United States for a period of ten years); Immigration Act of 1882, ch. 
376,22 Stat. 214 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. §§ 1551-74 (2006» (transferring authority 
over the landing of immigrants from individual states to the United States Treasury Depart-
ment); Page Act of 1875, ch. 141, 18 Stat. 477 (repealed 1974) (prohibiting the immigration of 
prostitutes, contract laborers and convicts from "China, Japan, or any Oriental country"). 
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1. The Demise of State Sovereignty 
Following the Supreme Court's decision in the Passenger Cases strik-
ing down the New York and Massachusetts head taxes, New York amended 
its immigration statute in an attempt to avoid the constitutional infirmity. 
The revised law required each ship owner or consignee to pay a $300 bond 
to the New York Commissioners of Emigration-the state agency that ad-
ministered the landing of immigrants at New York's Castle Garden depot-
for every passenger arriving from a foreign port. Each bond was used to 
indemnify the state against the cost of supporting that passenger for four 
years, at which time it would be returned. Owners could avoid the sizeable 
bond, however, by instead paying a nonrefundable "commutation fee" of 
$1.50 per passenger. As the state expected, owners invariably opted to pay 
the commutation fee. The amended law reached the Supreme Court in the 
1875 case Henderson v. Mayor of New York. lOl 
The parties' arguments reprised those in the Passenger Cases, centering 
on the familiar, if still constitutionally murky, distinction between commerce 
and police. The state added only that the "optional" nature of the chal-
lenged commutation fee distinguished it from the head tax struck down by 
the Court a quarter-century earlier. 102 A unanimous Court rejected that argu-
ment, holding that because the "purpose and effect" of the scheme was to 
tax the owners of vessels for the privilege of landing foreign passengers, the 
provision was as much an unconstitutional tax on passengers as the statute at 
issue in the Passenger Cases. I03 
Although the Court's holding flowed predictably from the Passenger 
Cases, its construction of the federal immigration power did not. In the 
Passenger Cases, only Justice McLean had rejected outright the position that 
Congress and the states, as "two distinct sovereignties," possessed "concur-
rent power ... to regulate the same thing."I04 In Henderson, by contrast, a 
unanimous Court concluded that all aspects of transporting foreigners to the 
United States constituted commerce with foreign nations, and therefore was 
the exclusive domain of Congress. As Justice Miller observed, since the 
Court held a half-century earlier in Gibbons v. Ogden that commerce with 
foreign nations encompassed laws concerning navigation, 
the transportation of passengers from European ports to those of 
the United States has attained a magnitude and importance far be-
yond its proportion at that time to other branches of commerce. It 
101 92 U.S. 259 (1875). The plaintiff, a British ship owner, challenged the law as an 
unconstitutional regulation of foreign commerce by a state. The Court merged the case with a 
challenge to a similar provision of a Louisiana statute. 
102 The "right of paying ... a small sum instead of giving a bond of indemnity," the state 
insisted, "cannot be tortured into an indirect mode of imposing a tax or duty upon the passen-
ger as such." Jd. at 265. 
103 Jd. at 268. 
104 The Passenger Cases, 48 U.S. at 399 (McLean, J., concurring). 
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has become a part of our commerce with foreign nations, of vast 
interest to this country, as well as to the immigrants who come 
among us to find a welcome and a home within our borders. In 
addition to the wealth which some of them bring, they bring still 
more largely the labor which we need to till our soil, build our 
railroads and develop the latent resources of the country . . . .105 
25 
Wherever immigration had fallen on the state/federal, police/commerce con-
tinuum as a matter of history, the ever-growing importance of immigrant 
labor to the nation's material progress had now drawn it completely and de-
cisively within the scope of the federal commerce power. "Can it be 
doubted," Miller queried, "that a law which prescribes the terms on which 
vessels shall engage in [the transportation of foreign passengers to the 
United States] is a law regulating this branch of commerce?"I06 
Previously, some members of the Court, including several of the jus-
tices who decided the Passenger Cases, had supposed "a kind of neutral 
ground"107 of commercial regulation that states could occupy so long as they 
did not interfere with an act of Congress. In Henderson, by contrast, the 
Court declared that any regulation that burdened commerce with foreign na-
tions was necessarily national in character. lOs In the regulation of immigra-
tion, at least, "neutral ground" between state and federal authority was a 
thing of the past. Americans' perception of the relationship of immigration 
to the nation's material well being had been so fundamentally transformed 
over the quarter-century since the Court decided the Passenger Cases, that 
all nine justices now explicitly acknowledged the essentially national nature 
of the issue. 
Moreover, only the full federalization of immigration regulation, the 
Court reasoned, would enable the United States to act as a single, unified 
sovereign in its relations with foreign governments. A law that impairs im-
migration, Miller explained, "may properly be called international." 109 He 
continued: 
It belongs to that class of laws which concern the exterior relation 
of this whole nation with other nations and governments . . . . It is 
... in an eminent degree, a subject which concerns our interna-
tional relations, in regard to which foreign nations ought to be con-
sidered and their rights respected, whether the rule be established 
by treaty or by legislation. 110 
105 Henderson, 92 U.S. at 270. 
106 Jd. at 270-71. 
107 Jd. at 272. 
108Jd. at 273. 
109 Jd. 
IIOJd. 
26 Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Law Review [Vol. 45 
Not only did the Court in Henderson firmly and unambiguously ground the 
federal immigration power in Congress's constitutionally enumerated com-
merce authority, but the Court also understood that authority specifically to 
encompass the foreign-affairs dimension of federal immigration policy. 
On the same day it decided Henderson, a unanimous Court gave the 
foreign-affairs rationale for federal exclusivity even greater weight in Chy 
Lung v. Freeman, striking down a California bond requirement similar to the 
New York scheme. 11I The California provision, however, applied only to 
specific enumerated classes of immigrants, including, among others, pau-
pers, lunatics, and criminals, as well as "lewd and debauched women"-the 
class to which the Chy Lung plaintiff, a Chinese woman, had been as-
signed. ll2 The Court objected to the law's placement "in the hands of a sin-
gle [commissioner]" the authority to require or commute a bond, and thus 
"to prevent entirely vessels engaged in a foreign trade, say with China, from 
carrying passengers, or to compel them to submit to systematic extortion of 
the grossest kind."ll3 The consequences of such potential abuse extended far 
beyond the helplessness of even highly meritorious passengers before such a 
"potent commissioner."114 "[A] silly, an obstinate, or a wicked commis-
sioner may bring disgrace upon the whole country, the enmity of a powerful 
nation, or the loss of an equally powerful friend."115 The Court was particu-
larly troubled by the notion that a single state could provoke an international 
conflict for which the national government would bear responsibility. The 
Court asked whether the Constitution had "done so foolish a thing as to 
leave it in the power of the States to pass laws whose enforcement renders 
the general government liable to just reclamations which it must answer 
.... "116 "[H]as the Constitution ... done so foolish a thing," the Court 
asked, "as to leave it in the power of the States to pass laws whose enforce-
ment renders the general government liable to just reclamations which it 
must answer ... ?" "The Constitution of the United States is no such instru-
ment," the Court concluded.ll7 Rather, the authority to regulate commerce 
with foreign nations, "the responsibility for the character of those regula-
tions, and for the manner of their execution, belongs solely to the national 
government."118 "If it be otherwise," the Court concluded, "a single State 
can, at her pleasure, embroil us in disastrous quarrels with other nations."119 
Notwithstanding the apparent capacity of the Commerce Clause to accom-
111 92 U.S. 275, 276 (1875). 
1121d. at 276 (internal quotations omitted). 
IIJ Id. at 278. 
1141d. at 279. 
115 Id. "[I]f citizens of our own government were treated by any foreign nation as subjects 
of the Emperor of China have been actually treated under this law," the Court insisted, "no 
administration could withstand the call for a demand on such government for redress." Id. 
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modate not only federal exclusivity in immigration matters, but also a range 
of foreign considerations, the Court would upend this analysis a mere four-
teen years later in the Chinese Exclusion Case. 120 
2. The "Business of Immigration": Foreign Commerce and the 
Consolidation of the Federal Immigration Power 
The Court's decision in Henderson striking down New York's head 
money system devastated the state's ability to fund the administration of the 
Castle Garden depot-the "great throat" of European immigration to the 
United States, as it was often called. In response, New York abandoned its 
long-standing resistance to federal regulation and called for swift and ag-
gressive national action. 121 After several years of concerted lobbying by 
New York and several other seaboard states, Congress responded with the 
Immigration Act of 1882.122 The Act transferred authority to regulate the 
landing of immigrants from the states to the federal government, and em-
powered the Treasury Secretary to contract with state immigration commis-
sions to examine passengers and to exclude "any convict, lunatic, idiot, or 
any person unable to take care of himself or herself without becoming a 
public charge."123 The Act further provided that a duty of fifty cents be 
collected for each foreign passenger, to be paid into the United States Trea-
sury to fund the administration of the Act, and to assist sick or destitute 
immigrants. 124 
If Henderson and Chy Lung established the exclusivity of federal au-
thority to regulate immigration, the Supreme Court's unanimous 1884 deci-
sion in the Head Money Cases,125 upholding the 1882 Act's fifty cent per 
capita duty, concretized the nature and scope of that authority. The opinion 
of the Court-again authored by Justice Miller-reaffirmed that immigra-
tion lay squarely within Congress's commerce power. In reply to the plain-
tiff ship master's contention that the duty was in fact an unconstitutional 
direct tax, lacking in uniformity and extracted for a "purpose [that] has 
nothing to do with the general welfare,"126 the Court observed: 
The burden imposed on the ship owner by this statute is the mere 
incident of the regulation of commerce-of that branch of foreign 
commerce which is involved in immigration. . . . Its provisions, 
from beginning to end, relate to the subject of immigration, and 
120 See infra Part II.B. 
121 See Lindsay, supra note 22, at 215-17. 
122 Immigration Act of 1882, ch. 376, §§ 1-4, 22 Stat. 214 (codified as amended at 8 
U.S.c. §§ 1551-74 (2006)). 
1231d. § 2. 
124/d. § I. 
125 Edye v. Robertson (The Head Money Cases), 112 U.S. 580 (1884). The Head Money 
Cases consolidated two challenges to the 1882 Act, both originating in New York: Edye v. 
Robertson and Cunard Steamship Company v. Robertson. 
126 Id. at 583. 
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they are aptly designed to mitigate the evils inherent in the busi-
ness of bringing foreigners to this country, as those evils affect 
both the immigrant and the people among whom he is suddenly 
brought and left to his own resources. 127 
Understood as the business of bringing foreigners into the United States, all 
aspects of immigration were now matters of commerce. 128 Gone were the 
Court's earlier deliberations over the boundary between "commerce" and 
the domain of internal police, or the distinction between foreign passengers 
who remained on board a ship, and those who had "mingled" with the local 
population. Immigration qua immigration was now the province of 
Congress. 
As Miller's reference to the "evils" associated with immigration sug-
gests, the opinion gave expression to the nation's increasing concern about 
the economic, moral, and racial fitness of the most recent European arrivals. 
Miller observed that the purpose of the 1882 Act "is humane, is highly bene-
ficial to the poor and helpless immigrant, and is essential to the protection of 
people in whose midst they are deposited by the steamships .... "129 He 
appeared incredulous that after the Court struck down similar state laws in 
Henderson, the plaintiff steamship company could now propose that Con-
gress, too, lacked the power to impose a per capita duty on foreign passen-
gers. To adopt that position would be 
to hold that [the power] does not exist at all-that the framers of 
the Constitution have so worded that remarkable instrument, that 
the ships of all nations . . . can, without restraint or regulation, 
deposit here ... the entire European population of criminals, pau-
pers, and diseased persons, without making any provision to pre-
serve them from starvation, and its concomitant sufferings .... 130 
The Head Money Cases thus completed the process that began with the Pas-
senger Cases and accelerated in Henderson and Chy Lung of transferring 
authority from state legislatures to Congress. Taken together, these cases 
concluded the decades-long process of federalizing regulatory responsibility 
for the formerly "local" immigration problems of pauperism and crime. 
Even as the Court's emphasis on the commercial aspects of immigration pre-
127 [d. at 595. 
128 The Head Money Cases marked the United States' first appearance as a party in an 
immigration case. The government's brief relied exclusively on a theory of inherent sover-
eignty rooted in international law to argue that immigrants were foreclosed from challenging 
the constitutionality of the government's conduct-a fact that lends strong support to my 
broader contention that, while Chinese exclusion served as the catalyst for the Court's adoption 
of the plenary power doctrine, the true origins of that doctrinal development lie in a much 
broader critique of mostly European immigration. Brief for the United States at 2-4, Edye v. 
Robertson, 112 U.S. 580 (1884) (No. 754). See also Cleveland, supra note 16, at 110-11. 
129 The Head Money Cases, 112 U.S. at 590-91. 
130 [d. at 591. 
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served a clear conceptual link to the purpose-oriented analysis of the mid-
century cases, its increasing attention to the foreign affairs dimension of im-
migration regulation, as well as the external nature of the threat posed by 
"unfit" European immigrants, edged the Court closer to an immigration 
power defined by its application to non-citizens. 
The same day that the Head Money Cases confirmed an expansive con-
gressional authority over immigration, however, a second case, Chew Heong 
v. United States, 13l made equally clear that such authority was limited by 
important judicially enforceable constraints. At issue in Chew Heong was a 
provision of the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882 requiring Chinese laborers 
who had resided in the United States before the Act took effect, and then 
subsequently departed, to obtain a certificate of reentry in order to gain read-
mission to the country. A brief account of the Act's historical background is 
in order. 
In 1868, the United States and China entered into the Burlingame 
Treaty, recognizing the "inherent and inalienable right of man to change his 
home and allegiance" and promising to extend to each other's citizens the 
same privileges and immunities as citizens of the most favored nation.132 
Within less than a decade, a ferocious anti-Chinese movement led by the 
California Workingmen's Party had secured enough political power to re-
write the state constitution to permit a host of repressive measures, including 
the exclusion of Chinese workers from many types of labor, denial of the 
right to vote in state elections, and the forced relocation of resident Chinese 
into ghettos. When the federal courts invalidated most of the anti-Chinese 
measures on the ground that they violated the most-favored-nation provision 
of the Burlingame Treaty and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, California labor and political leaders pressed aggressively for 
national legislation. 133 President Hayes vetoed a highly restrictive bill 
passed by Congress in 1879 on the ground that it violated the Burlingame 
Treaty, but promptly sent a commission to China to renegotiate that agree-
ment.134 The commission returned in 1880 with a new treaty permitting the 
United States to "regulate, limit, or suspend," though "not absolutely pro-
hibit" the entry of Chinese laborers,135 but affirming that Chinese laborers 
currently present in the United States "shall be allowed to go and come of 
their own free will ... and shall be accorded all the rights, privileges, immu-
nities and exemptions as ... citizens ... of the most favored nation."136 The 
following year, Congress passed and President Arthur signed the Chinese 
131 112 U.S. 536 (1884). 
132 See supra note 37 and accompanying text. 
133 On the role of organized labor in the California anti-Chinese movement, see ALEXAN. 
DER SAXTON, THE INDISPENSABLE ENEMY: LABOR AND THE ANTI-CHINESE MOVEMENT IN 
CALIFORNIA (1971). 
134 See SALYER, supra note 15, at 12-15. 
135 Immigration Treaty of 1880, U.S.-China, art. I, Nov. 17, 1880, 22 Stat. 826. 
136 [d. at art. II. 
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Exclusion Act of 1882, barring the entry of Chinese laborers into the United 
States for a period of ten years and prohibiting Chinese laborers present in 
the United States ninety days before the passage of the Act from returning 
unless they obtained a certificate of identification prior to departure. 137 After 
federal judges in San Francisco created a broad set of exemptions to the 
certificate requirement, Congress amended the statute on September 15, 
1884, clarifying that the certificate was the "only evidence permissible to 
establish [a] right of re-entry."138 
Chew Heong, a Chinese laborer, first arrived in San Francisco on No-
vember 17, 1880, and remained until June 18, 1881, when he departed for 
Honolulu. During his absence, Congress enacted the Chinese Exclusion Act 
of 1882 and the 1884 amendments. When Chew Heong sought readmission 
to the United States in September of 1884, he was denied entry on the 
ground that he lacked the certificate required by the 1882 and 1884 Acts. 
The question before the Court was whether the certificate requirement ap-
plied to Chinese laborers who resided in the United States on the date of the 
1880 treaty, but departed prior to the 1882 Act and remained outside of the 
United States until after the 1884 amendments. 139 Chew Heong contended 
that the Burlingame Treaty secured for him the right to reenter, even though 
he had not procured "a collector's certificate for which the law, at [the] time 
[of his departure], made no provision."14o The government argued that such 
an interpretation would defeat Congress's clear intent. 141 . 
The Court sustained Chew Heong's challenge. In a decision that stands 
in marked contrast with the Court's adoption of the plenary power doctrine 
just five years later, it held that the 1880 treaty guaranteed to Chinese labor-
ers residing in the United States at the time of its adoption "the right[] of 
free ingress and egress."142 Because the strict application of the certificate 
requirement urged by the government would defeat that right, Justice 
Harlan's majority opinion read into the provision an exception for Chinese 
laborers who had resided in the United States but departed before the re-
quirement took effect. 
Harlan appealed to national sovereignty as a rationale for constraining 
Congress's authority to regulate immigration, rather than as a license for 
governmental power. He began his analysis by invoking the international 
obligations of sovereign nations: 
[T]he court should be slow to assume that Congress intended to 
violate the stipulations of a treaty, so recently made with the gov-
ernment of another country. ''There would no longer be any se-
131 Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882, ch. 126, 22 Stat. 58. 
138 Act of July 5, 1885, ch. 220, 23 Stat. 115, 116 (1884). On the federal courts' frustra-
tion of the certificate requirement, see SALYER, supra note 15 at 18-20. 
139 Chew Heong v. United States, 112 U.S. 536, 538-39 (1884). 
140 Id. at 539. 
141Id. 
142Id. at 543. 
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curity," says Vattel, "no longer any commerce between mankind, 
if they did not think themselves obliged to keep faith with each 
other, and to perform their promises." . . . [T]he honor of the 
government and people of the United States is involved in every 
inquiry whether rights secured by such stipulations shall be recog-
nized and protected. 143 
31 
Harlan thus rejected the government's "supposition ... that Congress, while 
professing to faithfully execute treaty stipulations, and recognizing . . . that 
they secured ... the 'right to go from and come to the United States,' in-
tended to make its protection depend upon the performance of conditions 
[that were] physically impossible to perform."I44 In light of the Court's con-
clusion in the Chinese Exclusion Case just five years later that national sov-
ereignty under international law serves as a blanket license for virtually 
unrestrained federal authority, the force Harlan afforded to the United States' 
treaty obligations as a check on Congress is especially remarkable. 145 
II. "NATIONAL SECURITY" AND THE BIRTH OF THE PLENARY 
POWER DOCTRINE 
Part I demonstrated that in the half-century preceding the advent of the 
plenary power doctrine, the federal immigration power resided exclusively 
in Congress's constitutionally delegated commerce power; that state and fed-
eral authority alike were premised on the purpose of a given regulation, 
rather than the foreignness of the persons on whom it acted; and that such 
authority was subject to judicially enforceable constraints. Part II explains 
how and why this changed. It argues that the key to modem immigration 
exceptionalism lies not only in the Supreme Court's elaboration of a federal 
authority inherent in sovereignty, but perhaps more fundamentally in an ur-
143 [d. at 539-40. 
144 [d. at 554-55. 
145 Justice Field lodged a scathing dissent previewing his majority opinion in the Chinese 
Exclusion Case. When Congress refuses to comply with some aspect of a treaty, Field in-
sisted, "it is not for this court or any other court to call in question the validity or wisdom of its 
action .... " [d. at 562 (Field, 1., dissenting). Most of Field's analysis, however, consisted of a 
long discussion of what he considered the distinct, and distinctly destructive, characteristics of 
Chinese laborers as a class. "[T]hey had a wonderful capacity to live in narrow quarters 
without injury to their health," he instructed, "and were generally content with small gains and 
the simplest fare. They were perfectly satisfied with what would hardly furnish a scanty sub-
sistence to our laborers and artisans. Successful competition with them was, therefore, impos-
sible .... " [d. at 565-66. Congress enacted the Chinese Exclusion Act, Field observed, in 
order to halt "the certainty" that "vast hordes would pour in upon us, overrunning our coast 
and controlling its institutions. A restriction upon their further immigration was felt to be 
necessary to prevent the degradation of white labor, and to preserve to ourselves the inestima-
ble benefits of our Christian civilization." [d. at 569. Further, because "[t]he consideration 
for allowing free emigration from China ... [had] failed," id. at 570, the United States could 
abrogate the treaty with no breach of faith to China. "If the construction I give works hardship 
to any persons," Field concluded, "it is for Congress, not this court, to afford the remedy." Id. 
at 576-77. 
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gent and pervasive discourse of national self-preservation that emerged at 
the end of the nineteenth century.146 For reasons that have little to do with 
constitutional doctrine, by the mid-1880s a broad consensus had developed 
among American legislators, judges, and other opinion-makers that un-
checked immigration posed something approaching an existential threat to 
the republic. In response, they transformed the federal immigration power 
from a form of commercial authority grounded in the Commerce Clause 
into a power of national self-defense derived from the nation's inherent 
sovereignty. 
Section A analyzes the widely influential writings of immigration crit-
ics such as Congressman Henry Cabot Lodge, the economist Richmond 
Mayo-Smith, and the economist and Superintendent of the U.S. Census 
Francis A. Walker, as well the congressional debates that these critics di-
rectly shaped. These and other prominent figures advanced a forceful-and 
in the 1880s and 1890s, ubiquitous-critique of European immigration to 
the United States that interwove concerns about the decline of the "Ameri-
can standard of living," the racial unfitness of unassimilable "new immi-
grants" from southern and eastern Europe, and the nation's diminished 
capacity to "digest" large numbers of new arrivals. Section B demonstrates 
that the terms of this critique closely paralleled the construction of Chinese 
immigrants in the inaugural plenary power cases. Situating the Chinese Ex-
clusion Case and the virulent anti-Chinese rhetoric that saturated the Court's 
opinion in the context of this broader critique of immigration reveals that 
both the cultural and legal origins of modern immigration exceptionalism lie 
146 This argument may be understood to imply that the founding rationale for immigration 
exceptionalism-the invocation of a national right of self-preservation against an existential 
threat of alien origin-was unprecedented in the history of American immigration lawmaking. 
This implication of novelty raises the question of whether the infamous Alien Act of 1798, 
which authorized the President to remove any alien he judged "dangerous to the peace and 
safety of the United States," Alien Act, ch. 58, 1 Stat. 570, 571 (1798), may have furnished an 
early model for the plenary power doctrine. Although some of the arguments advanced in 
support of the Alien Act foreshadowed the national security rationale a century later, there is 
little basis to conclude that the Act itself served in any meaningful way as precedent or inspira-
tion for the plenary power doctrine. First, although some of the Act's supporters justified the 
measure on the basis of necessity, or "self-preservation," the claim that Congress possessed an 
inherent power to expel aliens did not figure significantly in the debates. Instead, supporters 
were determined to derive congressional authority from the enumerated clauses, including the 
Necessary and Proper, Commerce, Migration, General Welfare, Common Defense, and Repub-
lican Government Clauses. Second, and most importantly, the Alien Act was adopted during a 
period of extraordinary hostility toward France (including the severing of diplomatic relations 
between the countries as well as actual naval combat) known as the "quasi-war," with the 
purpose of expelling French agents present in the United States. Moreover, it was allowed to 
expire just two years later, in 1800, without a judicial resolution of its constitutionality, which 
was vigorously disputed at the time and the subject of much doubt throughout the nineteenth 
century. See generally Cleveland, supra note 16, at 87-98. Indeed, even Justice Field, the 
leading early expositor of the plenary power doctrine, observed in 1893 that the Alien Act had 
"ever since been the subject of universal condemnation." At no time between 1798 and the 
enactment of the Immigration Act of 1891, Field declared, "has any public man had the bold-
ness to advocate the deportation of friendly aliens in time of peace." Fong Vue Ting v. United 
States, 149 U.S. 698, 750 (1893) (Field, J., dissenting). 
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in a highly contingent, historically novel association between foreign pauper 
labor and foreign aggression that, for contemporaries, warranted categori-
cally defining all laws touching on immigration as matters of national self-
preservation. 
A. Immigration as Foreign Aggression 
Modem immigration exceptionalism originated in a fundamental antag-
onism between the nation's cherished values of free labor and republican 
government and the unprecedented social and economic dislocations 
wrought by the industrialization of the northern economy. For nearly a cen-
tury following the nation's founding, both immigration policy and the legal 
authority to regulate immigration were directly shaped by Americans' pre-
vailing political-economic worldview, which we might call free labor repub-
licanism. As we saw in Part I.A, the United States' relative liberality with 
respect to immigration, as well as the reservation of most immigration regu-
lation to the states, rested on a broad confidence that an open continent, easy 
access to land, and exposure to republican political values and institutions 
would assimilate all comers. In the decades following the Civil War, that 
confidence was severely eroded. 
At the center of free labor republicanism was a model of male citizen-
ship that located the capacity for civic virtue and disinterested political par-
ticipation in the vaunted idea of personal "independence." In the early 
republican period, such independence depended on a man's ownership of 
real property and control over his family's livelihood. 147 By the postbellum 
era, however, for the first time in the nation's history a majority of male 
workers labored for a wage,148 as industrialization transformed a citizenry 
composed largely of self-employed farmers and craftsmen into a population 
of wage earners. This wholesale reconstruction of the nation's labor system 
reverberated well beyond the economic sphere, spurring a profound reorgan-
ization of Americans' residential geography, social relations, and family life. 
Most importantly for present purposes, it meant that free labor republican-
ism, and the meaning of personal independence in particular, would either 
adapt or fade into history. 
Under traditional free labor republicanism, wage labor carried powerful 
connotations of dependency and subordination. In relinquishing the eco-
nomic independence associated with property ownership and self-employ-
ment, hirelings were understood to have ceded their personal autonomy and 
147 See GORDON WOOD, THE RADICALISM OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 178 (1991); 
Ruth H. Bloch, The Gendered Meanings of Virtue in Revolutionary America, 13 SIGNS 37, 54-
55 (1987). 
148 DAVID MONTGOMERY, BEYOND EQUALITY: LABOR AND THE RADICAL REpUBLICANS, 
1862-1872, at 28-30 (1967). 
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political agency to the will of their employers. 149 Whether a permanent class 
of wage laborers was compatible with virtuous, independent republican citi-
zenship thus became the paramount ideological problem of the years follow-
ing the Civil War. In the era of wage labor, would property ownership and 
self-employment remain an essential component of personal independence? 
Or might worker-citizens also establish their self-owners hip-their indepen-
dence-through the sale of their labor? By the 1870s, the latter view was 
ascendant, as congressional Republicans and political intellectuals in the 
North and South alike agreed that a man's capacity to alienate his labor for a 
price manifested his independence, rather than a form of feminizing 
dependency. 150 
By identifying a worker's capacity to sell his labor as an ideological 
cornerstone of economic and political independence, the postbellum consen-
sus staked the future of free labor republicanism on the moral integrity of the 
wage contract. The quality of American citizenship and, ultimately, the very 
future of the republic, appeared to lie in the balance. 
* * * 
The national debate over the inclusion of millions of foreign wage la-
borers within the American polity thus served as a referendum on the 
broader question of whether an economy premised on liberal economic rela-
149 LAWRENCE B. GLICKMAN, A LIVING WAGE: AMERICAN WORKERS AND THE MAKING 
OF CONSUMER CULTURE 22-24 (1997); MONTGOMERY, supra note 148, at 30-33; DANIEL T. 
RODGERS, THE WORK ETHIC IN INDUSTRIAL AMERICA, 1850-1920, at 30-64 (1974); DAVID R. 
ROEDIGER, THE WAGES OF WHITENESS: RACE AND THE MAKING OF THE AMERICAN WORKING 
CLASS 65-87 (1992); AMY DRU STANLEY, FROM BONDAGE TO CONTRACT: WAGE LABOR, 
MARRIAGE, AND THE MARKET IN THE AGE OF SLAVE EMANCIPATION 9-10 (1998); ROBERT J. 
STEINFELD, THE INVENTION OF FREE LABOR: THE EMPLOYMENT RELATION IN ENGLISH AND 
AMERICAN LAW AND CULTURE, 1350-1870, at 185-87 (1991); William E. Forbath, The Ambi-
guities of Free Labor: Labor and the Law in the Gilded Age, 1985 WIS. L. REV. 767,774-75 
(1985). 
150 The mid-century conflict over slavery, perhaps more than any other factor, helped to 
transform the ideological meaning of the wage contract: 
Abolitionists extolled the voluntary exchange of one's labor for a wage as the antith-
esis of slavery. The compulsion inherent in the slave system, they argued, violated 
the fundamental tenets of both economic morality and human nature, denying the 
right of man to govern himself, to enjoy bodily integrity, to own property, and to 
dispose of his labor at market price. Consent became the language of individual 
freedom, and thus acquired the moral and emotional weight of opposing human 
bondage. Slave emancipation and the victory of the Union Army further elevated 
the wage contract as the essence of freedom, individual economic agency, and male 
independence. The Civil Rights Act of 1866 enshrined this thinking in law, explic-
itly construing the right to contract for the sale of one's labor as an essential right of 
citizenship. 
Lindsay, supra note 22, at 193. See generally ERIC FoNER, RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA's 
UNFINISHED REVOLUTION, 1863-1877, at 244 (1989); STANLEY, supra note 149, at 1-97; RON-
ALD G. WALTERS, THE ANTI-SLAVERY ApPEAL: AMERICAN ABOLITIONISM AFTER 1830 (1976); 
Forbath, supra note 149, at 785-86. 
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tions was compatible with republican citizenship. In the final two decades 
of the nineteenth century, a growing chorus of Americans voiced their fears 
that it was not. In the face of increasingly intense wage competition and the 
appearance of entrenched poverty in the nation's cities, lawmakers, judges, 
labor spokesmen, and economists named as a -leading culprit a phenomenon 
that they called the "crisis of foreign pauper labor." Unlike "foreign pau-
pers," whose economic dependency had long drawn the attention of state 
lawmakers and charity administrators, foreign pauper laborers offended 
through an excess of economic competitiveness. Through their willingness 
to work for virtually any wage, critics charged, foreign pauper laborers 
robbed "American" workers of the income necessary to secure for their 
families a "civilized" standard of living, thereby degrading not only the la-
bor market, but also the ideological foundation of the republic-the personal 
independence and political virtue of the citizenry. For contemporaries, the 
economic pathology of foreign pauper labor thus threatened to drive a wedge 
through the center of late nineteenth-century American political economy, 
and to render incompatible the citizenly virtues so essential to the political 
health of the republic, and the economic instrument on which industrial pro-
gress depended-namely, the wage contract. 
The critique of foreign pauper labor initially took shape both in popular 
periodicals and in the congressional debates over the Contract Labor Act of 
1885, also known as the Foran Act. The Act prohibited the immigration of 
aliens who had entered into a labor contract prior to departing for the United 
States. 151 The greatness and durability of American civilization, the Act's 
proponents believed, depended above all on the fitness of its working class. 
The high wages and living standards demanded by American workers both 
testified to and assured the perpetuation of that fitness. "The American pro-
ducer is the essential ingredient ... in American civilization," explained 
Senator Henry Blair, one ofthe bill's leading congressional advocates. He is 
an "American civilizer [who] has attained a position where he has a certain 
amount of compensation ... allotted to him in the distribution of that which 
he produces .... "152 Ohio Congressman Martin Foran, the bill's sponsor in 
the House of Representatives, similarly emphasized that high wages were an 
essential condition of fit citizenship. "It may be laid down as a general 
proposition that can not be controverted, that the rate of wages determines 
the social, moral, and intellectual status of a people," he explained. "Low 
wages mean cheap men, ignorant, degraded, dangerous citizens. . . . 
Cheapen labor and you destroy the incentives that spur men to effort and 
improvement. Low wages signify debasement, ignorance, degradation, bru-
151 The Foran Act made it unlawful "to prepay the transportation. or in any way assist or 
encourage the importation or migration of any alien ... under contract or agreement ... made 
previous to the importation or migration of such alien ... to perform labor or service of any 
kind .... " Contract Labor Act of 1885, chs. 161-64.23 Stat. 332 (repealed 1952). 
152 16 CONGo RIle. 1.626 (1885). 
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tality. High wages signify intelligence, ingenuity, invention, and a higher 
order of manhood."153 
By placing a premium on a respectable standard of living, critics of 
foreign pauper labor helped to reconcile the emergence in the United States 
of a permanent wage earning class with the venerated repUblican ideal of 
virtuous citizenship. In so doing, they elaborated a historically novel politi-
cal economy of American citizenship, adapted specifically to a modern in-
dustrial system in which labor was fast becoming the norm rather than a 
disreputable exception. Senator Orville Platt, a Connecticut Republican, 
made explicit the vital nexus between high wages and the preservation of 
republican citizenship: 
[Y]ou must add to virtue and intelligence the prosperity of the 
citizen, if you expect the Republic to endure. . .. [T]o lower the 
standard of wages below fair remuneration is . . . vicious and de-
structive of republican institutions. . .. Up to this time those who 
have been willing to labor in this country under our system of free 
labor have been able to comfortably clothe themselves and [their] 
families; so that they could properly educate their children; so that 
by thrift and prudence ... [they] could ... secure a little home; 
attach themselves to the soil, and thus become conservative, patri-
otic citizens of the country .... [W]e shall have but half won the 
fight against slave labor and in favor of free labor in this country if 
... labor shall [not] be free and independent, and ... receive fair, 
even generous, compensation. 154 
Under the emergent model, virtuous citizenship would derive not only from 
property ownership and self-employment, but also from the receipt of a 
wage sufficient to afford a worker and his family a comfortable material 
existence and a measure of leisure. 
Determined to preserve the "civilization" of the American wage-earn-
ing class, a broad cross-section of policymakers, economists, and others di-
rected unprecedented attention to immigrant laborers' "habits, customs, 
[and] modes of living."155 Members of Congress zealously reported immi-
grants' inability to appreciate the creature comforts, often singling out the 
consumption habits of "new" immigrants from southern and eastern Europe 
for special condemnation. Congressman Foran cited accounts of Hungarian 
laborers "subsisting upon what an American laborer could not eat-such as 
mules, hogs, &c. [sic], which have been killed or died with cholera and 
other diseases."156 "[T]he habits, morals, and modes of living of the 
Italians [are] of the same general character,"157 he reported. Terence 
153 15 CONGo RIle. 5,351 (1884). 
154 16 CONGo RIle. 1,781 (1885). 
155 15 CONGo RIle. 5,349 (1884). 
156 [d. at 5,350. 
157 [d. 
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Powderly, the leader of the powerful Knights of Labor and the future United 
States Commissioner General of Immigration, agreed that new immigrants' 
uncivilized living standards rendered them unfit for both the American mar-
ket in free labor and for American citizenship. "We have Hungarians at 
work," Powderly insisted, "who are no more fit to live in this country than a 
hog is fit to grace a parlor."158 Foreign pauper laborers' degrading influence 
was due not to their poverty per se, but rather to their failure to aspire to a 
civilized standard of living. Francis Amasa Walker, the era's preeminent 
political economist and the future Chief of the United States Census Bureau, 
deplored the "foreigner, making his way into the little village, bringing ... 
not only a vastly lower standard of living, but too often an actual present 
incapacity to even understand the refinements of life and thought in the com-
munity in which he sought a home."159 
The Supreme Court endorsed this assessment when it was asked to clar-
ify the class of immigrant laborers excluded by the Contract Labor Act. The 
Act's purpose, explained a unanimous Court in Holy Trinity Church v. 
United States, was to "raise the standard of foreign immigrants, and to dis-
countenance the immigration of those who had not sufficient means in their 
own hands ... to pay their passage."160 The Court quoted directly from the 
House committee report on the Act: 
This class of immigrants care[s] nothing about our institutions, 
and in many instances [has] never heard of them; they are men 
whose passage is paid by the importers. . .. [T]hey are ignorant 
of our social condition, and that they may remain so they are iso-
lated and prevented from coming into contact with Americans. 
They are generally from the lowest social stratum, and live upon 
the coarsest food and in hovels of a character before unknown to 
American workmen. They, as a rule, do not become citizens, and 
are certainly not a desirable acquisition to the body politic. The 
inevitable tendency of their presence among us is to degrade 
American labor, and reduce it to the level of imported pauper 
labor. 161 
In the Court's estimation, foreign pauper laborers' degraded standards of liv-
ing held the "inevitable tendency" of poisoning the independence, self-re-
spect, and political virtue of the national citizenry. In a social and political 
context in which fitness for free labor was virtually coterminous with fitness 
for republican citizenship, immigrants' low standards of civilization weighed 
heavily against their political inclusion. 
1581d. at 5,356. 
159 Francis A. Walker, Immigration and Degradation, II FoRUM 634, 641 (1891). 
160 143 U.S. 457, 464 (1892). 
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Policymakers and other observers routinely rendered their critique of 
foreign pauper labor in the increasingly resonant language of heredity and 
race. The racial inheritance of the most recent, and increasingly visible, ad-
dition to the American laboring class-the "new" European immigrants-
was often singled out for special condemnation. As Walker explained, the 
defective classes were "increasingly drawn from the nations of southern and 
eastern Europe-peoples which have got no great good for themselves out 
of the race wars of centuries, [and have] ... remained hopelessly upon the 
lowest plane of industrial life."162 Massachusetts Republican Henry Cabot 
Lodge, perhaps the leading congressional advocate of immigration restric-
tion, emphasized that the invasion of foreign laborers was also an invasion 
of foreign races. "We have now before us race problems which are suffi-
cient to tax to the utmost the fortunate conditions with which nature has 
blessed US,"163 he explained in 1891. The changing source of European im-
migration was vital. "The immigration of people of those races which con-
tributed to the settlement and development of the United States is declining 
in comparison with that of races far removed in thought and speech and 
blood from the men who have made this country what it is."I64 
Policymakers drew extensively on images of national invasion and in-
festation to illustrate the unprecedented vulnerability of the American citi-
zenry. As Michigan Republican Byron Cutcheon declared, foreign pauper 
laborers were 
the Goths and Vandals of the modern era. They come only to lay 
waste, to degrade, and to destroy. They bring with them igno-
rance, degraded morals, a low standard of civilization, and no mo-
tive of intended American citizenship. Like the vast flights of 
grasshoppers and locusts, ... they sweep down upon our fields of 
labor to devour and strip from us the benefit of our customs and 
the laws protecting American labor, and then take their flight again 
back to the breeding places from which they came. 165 
Cutcheon's torrent of metaphors, like the statements of so many of his con-
temporaries, constructed a citizenry in perpetual jeopardy of violation. Re-
publican Senator Lot Morrill made explicit the hereditary dimension of that 
vulnerability. The nation was being overrun by immigrants "more danger-
ous to the individuality and deep-seated stamina of the American people, 
and more worthy of rigid quarantine, then even the most leprous diseases," 
he declared. 166 Morrill was referring specifically "to those whose inherent 
deficiencies and iniquities are thoroughbred, and who are [as] incapable of 
162 Walker, supra note 159, at 644. 
163 22 CONGo REC. 2,956 (1891). 
164 Id. 
165 15 CONGo REC. 5,369 (1884). 
166 W.M.F. Round, Immigration and Crime, 8 foRUM 428, 428 (1889) (quoting Senator 
Morrill). 
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evolution, whether in this generation or the next, as is the leopard to change 
his spotS."167 
Between the mid-1880s and the early 1890s, popular and social scien-
tific periodicals echoed congressional pronouncements that, in the absence 
of the requisite economic conditions and racial material, simply exposing 
immigrants to American values and institutions accomplished little as a 
force of assimilation. The nation appeared to be leaving behind the Jefferso-
nian and Lincolnian republic in which property ownership and independent 
labor were essential prerequisites for virtuous citizenship, and entering into a 
new and unfamiliar world. As Lodge wrote in an 1891 issue of the prestigi-
ous North American Review, the United States "no longer [has] endless 
tracts of fertile land crying for settlement. . . . [T]he conditions have 
changed utterly from the days when the supply of vacant land was indefinite, 
the demand for labor almost unbounded, and the supply of people very lim-
ited."168 To the dismay of Lodge and many of his contemporaries, the histor-
ical pillars of the exceptional republic had ceased to exist, as a host of social 
crises afflicting European cities-mass poverty, class conflict, radicalism, 
and political instability-had appeared on the horizon. For Lodge, in fact, 
that time had already arrived. "In many parts of the country," he concluded, 
"the struggle for existence in the large cities has become as fierce as in the 
old world."169 
At the heart of this pessimism lay a profound anxiety that the industrial 
transformation of labor-the displacement of the independent, agrarian pro-
ducer by the industrial hireling-had rendered the republican ideal of virtu-
ous independent citizenship a hollow anachronism. The belief that "the 
earth is the great disinfectant," explained Mayo-Smith, "and that all we need 
do is to get these depraved dregs of European civilization on to the land in 
order to reform them-it is in this early civilization that this saying is 
true."170 "As long as there was no danger of the labor market becoming 
overstocked," agreed a young Theodore Roosevelt in 1888, "we were able 
with safety to trust to our extraordinary powers of assimilation to turn the 
immigrants or their children, sooner or later, into American citizens, with the 
same feelings, prejudices[,] and habits of thought as the rest of US."171 "The 
growth of a proletariat," however, "would surely in the end bring about the 
overthrow of our whole system."172 
The critique of European immigration described in this Section both 
reflected and helped to manifest the emergence of a novel, distinctively 
modern understanding of the American polity. The quality of the citizenry 
would no longer be guaranteed by the assimilative influences of free labor 
1671d. 
168 Henry Cabot Lodge, The Restriction of Immigration, 152 N. AM. REV. 27, 34 (1891). 
1691d. 
170 Richmond Mayo-Smith, Control of Immigration, 3 POL. SCI. Q. 409, 413 (1888). 
171 Theodore Roosevelt, The Immigration Problem, 7 HARv. MONTHLY 85, 85-86 (1888). 
172 Id. at 86-87. 
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and republican political institutions. Rather, it would be defined in opposi-
tion to and defended against the forces of invasion: the uncivilized, racially 
inferior, citizenship-decaying material of unfit immigrant laborers. As we 
will see in the next Section, it is precisely this deep sense of vulnerability at 
the hands of a foreign menace that shaped the modern immigration power. 
B. "The National Right of Self-Preservation" 
This Section analyzes the legal advent of the modern era of immigra-
tion exceptionalism. When the Court announced in the Chinese Exclusion 
Case and subsequent decisions that Congress's authority to exclude aliens 
was inherent in the nation's sovereignty, essential to its self-preservation, 
and "conclusive upon the judiciary," it yoked the immigration power to 
Congress's undisputed authority over fundamental matters of national 
"peace and security," and the conduct of war. 173 Further, with the Immigra-
tion Act of 1891, and in various amendments to the Chinese Exclusion Act, 
Congress played an aggressive, if largely unacknowledged, role in claiming 
for itself an immigration authority that operated largely beyond the reach of 
judicial review. 
1. The Chinese Exclusion Case 
The Supreme Court's 1889 decision in Chae Chan Ping v. United 
States,174 titled the Chinese Exclusion Case by its author, Justice Stephen 
Field, shifted the source of congressional authority to regulate immigration 
from the Commerce Clause, where it had resided for more than half a cen-
tury, to the ill-defined, though apparently extra-constitutional, concept of na-
tional sovereignty. Writing for a unanimous Court, Justice Field translated 
the discourse of national emergency discussed above into a potent and dura-
ble rationale for immigration exceptionalism. He forged the immigration 
power into an instrument of national self-defense, to be deployed against 
invading armies of politically unassimilable, economically degraded, and ra-
cially suspect foreigners. Though Chinese laborers were in fact subjects of a 
"most favored nation" under the Burlingame and 1880 treaties, Field recast 
them as enemy aliens. 
Chae Chan Ping, a Chinese laborer, had resided in San Francisco from 
1875 until June 2, 1887, when he departed for China. He brought with him a 
certificate issued pursuant to the 1882 Act and 1884 amendments, entitling 
him to return to the United States. 175 On October 1, 1888, Congress again 
amended the Chinese Exclusion Act, now prohibiting any Chinese laborer 
who had resided in the United States and subsequently departed from ever 
173 See infra note 179. 
174 130 U.S. 581 (1889). 
175 [d. at 582. 
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returning. The Act thus voided every certificate of reentry issued under the 
1882 and 1884 Acts, and prohibited the landing of any Chinese laborer 
claiming admission on the basis of such a certificate. 176 Eight days later, 
Chae Chan Ping arrived in the port of San Francisco. When he presented his 
certificate, the collector denied him entry on the ground that "the certificate 
had been annulled and his right to land abrogated,"177 and detained him on 
board the passenger ship. The case came before the Court on a writ of 
habeas corpus. 17S 
Justice Field's opinion upholding Chae Chan Ping's exclusion resonated 
profoundly with the contemporaneous assessments of European immigration 
discussed above. 179 Like the critiques levied by Lodge, Mayo-Smith, and 
others against hordes of invading "foreign pauper laborers," Field's opinion 
was rooted in a historical narrative of anticipated economic value and repub-
lican ideals dashed by uncivilized standards of living, degradation of the 
wage contract, and, ultimately, racial difference. The Burlingame Treaty op-
erated in the opinion as the benchmark against which the nation's actual 
subsequent experience with Chinese immigration should be measured. ISO In 
Field's view, the past twenty years of Chinese immigration had made a 
mockery of the liberal optimism embodied in the Treaty and defied earlier 
expectations of its economic benefits. "The belief was general, and confi-
dently expressed, that great benefits would follow to the world generally and 
especially to the United States,"ISI he explained. On the basis of such ex-
176 Scott Act of 1888, ch. 1064, § 2, 25 Stat. 504 (repealed 1943). 
177 The Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. at 582. 
178 Chae Chan Ping acknowledged the nation's "inherent right [as] a sovereign power" to 
prohibit the entry of aliens into its territory-an authority derived, he noted, from Congress's 
foreign commerce power-but insisted that such a right did not authorize the United States to 
revoke his "vested right to return." [d. at 585. The source of that right, he argued, was 
twofold. First, because he had come to the United States under the Burlingame Treaty, which 
recognized the "inherent and inalienable right of man to change his home and allegiance," 
Congress could not oblige him "to surrender [his] residence ... acquired under such invita-
tions and guaranties." /d. at 586. The only plausible basis historically for "compelling an 
alien friend to leave the country," he argued, grimly foreshadowing Justice Field's opinion, 
"was that it was a measure in preparation for anticipated war, and, therefore, an exercise of the 
war power." [d. Second, Chae Chan Ping argued that the United States was contractually 
bound to readmit him. The certificate provisions in the 1882 and 1884 Acts "contained an 
offer on the part of the United States to every Chinese laborer then in this country, if he should 
leave the country and comply with the conditions therein ... to permit him to return," he 
maintained. [d. at 587. 
179 The holding rested on two closely related points of law. First, the provision of the 
1880 treaty stating that Chinese laborers currently in the United States "shall be allowed to go 
and come of their own free will" did not endow such laborers with a judicially enforceable 
right. Rather, the authority to judge the wisdom or propriety of disregarding a treaty obliga-
tion, the Court explained, "has not been confided to the judiciary, ... but to the executive and 
legislative departments of the government .... " [d. at 602. Second, Congress possessed the 
authority to prohibit Chinese laborers who departed the United States from returning. Such 
authority was incident to the United States' sovereignty as an independent nation, the Court 
declared, and therefore "conclusive upon the judiciary." /d. at 606. 
180 [d. at 592. 
181 [d. 
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pectations, he suggested, the United States had recognized the "inherent and 
inalienable right of man to change his home and allegiance, and also the 
mutual advantage of the free migration and emigration . . . from the one 
country to the other."182 
Even before the ink on the Treaty had dried, however, "events were 
transpiring on the Pacific Coast which soon dissipated the anticipations in-
dulged as to the benefits to follow the immigration of Chinese to this coun-
try."183 The Chinese laborers who arrived on the Pacific coast after the 
discovery of gold in California in 1848 "proved to be exceedingly useful,"I84 
Field explained, but as their numbers increased they came into competition 
with American workers. 185 "[C]ontent with the simplest fare, such as would 
not suffice for our laborers and artisans," and without families to support, 
the labor market competition "between them and our people was . . . alto-
gether in their favor."186 "The differences of race added greatly to the diffi-
culties of the situation,"187 Field continued. Notwithstanding the Treaty's 
"favorable provisions," Chinese immigrants "remained strangers in the 
land, residing apart by themselves, and adhering to the customs and usages 
of their own country. It seemed impossible for them to assimilate with our 
people, or to make any changes in their habits or modes of living."188 As 
their numbers grew, Field reported, the "people of the coast saw ... great 
danger that at no distant day that portion of our country would be overrun by 
them, unless prompt action was taken to restrict their immigration."189 
In response, the 1878 California Constitutional Convention appealed to 
Congress that the immigration of Chinese laborers "was in numbers ap-
proaching the character of an Oriental invasion, and was a menace to our 
civilization ... that they retained the habits and customs of their own coun-
try, and in fact constituted a Chinese settlement within the state, without any 
interest in our country or its institutions."I90 So urgent was the cause, Field 
explained, that Congress felt "impelled" to send a commission to China to 
renegotiate the terms of the Burlingame Treaty. 191 Those negotiations pro-
duced the Treaty of 1880, permitting the United States to limit or suspend 
Chinese immigration, thus clearing the way for the Chinese Exclusion Act of 
1882. That Act suspended the immigration of Chinese laborers for a period 
of ten years and conditioned the return of departing laborers on their posses-
sion of a certificate of reentry. The early enforcement of the Act, Field ex-
plained, "was attended with great embarrassment, from the suspicious nature 
1821d. at 592 (quoting the Burlingame Treaty, supra note 37, art. 5). 
1831d. at 593. 
184 Id. at 594. 
1851d. 




190 ld. at 595-96. 
191 Id. at 596. 
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... of the testimony offered to establish the residence of the parties."192 
Congress responded with the 1884 amendments, making the certificate the 
only permissible evidence of an immigrant's right of reentry.193 However, 
the "same difficulties and embarrassments continued" after the Court in 
Chew Heong exempted from the certificate requirement laborers who had 
departed before the 1882 Act and returned after the 1884 amendments. Only 
then, Field concluded, after six years of rampant, fraudulent evasion of the 
Act, did Congress void all previously issued certificates of reentry.194 
After spending twelve pages narrating this history, Justice Field dis-
posed of the basic legal issue-Chae Chan Ping's claim of a treaty-based 
right to reenter-in a single, apparently legally uncontroversial paragraph. 
Field conceded that the 1888 Act directly contravened the 1868 and 1880 
treaties, but maintained that this did not invalidate the Act. Because the 
Constitution declares both treaties and acts of Congress "to be the supreme 
law of the land, and [gives] no paramount authority ... to one over the 
other," he reasoned, "the last expression of the sovereign will must con-
trol. "195 Indeed, that analysis reflected the Court's long-standing position, 
which it had reaffirmed only the previous term. 196 
If Field could thus summarily dispose of Chae Chan Ping's legal argu-
ment, why, then, did he go to such lengths to instruct his audience on the 
history of Sino-American treaty relations, the degradation of American la-
bor, Chinese racial difference, the failure to assimilate, and the chronic eva-
sions of the exclusion laws? After all, none of these facts appears relevant, 
let alone necessary, to his legal conclusion. The answer, I propose, is that 
the historical narrative provides the essential foundation for the broader am-
bition of Field's opinion-to reconstruct the federal immigration power as an 
instrument of national self-defense, grounded in United States' sovereignty 
as an independent nation and reserved for the political departments of 
government. 
Field began that reconstruction by defining the nation's sovereignty in 
terms of Congress's enumerated powers with respect to "foreign countries 
and their subjects or citizens."197 "The powers to declare war, make treaties, 
suppress insurrection, repel invasion, regulate foreign commerce, secure re-
publican governments to the states, and admit subjects of other nations to 
citizenship, are all sovereign powers,"198 he explained. Although at first 
blush the inclusion of foreign commerce on a list otherwise comprised of 
diplomatic- and security-related powers is somewhat striking, Field hastened 
192 /d. at 598. 
1931d. 
1941d. at 599. 
19S1d. at 600. 
196 See Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190, 194 (1888) (holding that when a treaty and 
federal statute conflict, the more recent one controls). 
197 The Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. at 604. 
1981d. 
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to add that all such sovereign powers were "restricted in their exercise" not 
only by "considerations of public policy and justice," but "by the Constitu-
tion itself."I99 Read in light of Henderson, Chy Lung, the Head Money 
Cases, and Chew Heong, this passage could plausibly be interpreted to crys-
tallize what I have argued was the Court's established understanding of the 
federal immigration power: an authority derived from Congress's commerce 
power, encompassing the foreign-relations dimension of immigration, and 
subject to constitutional constraints. 
Upon thus reaffirming the essentially national nature of the United 
States' sovereignty over immigration, Field pivoted sharply. Building on the 
historical groundwork laid earlier in the opinion, he wrote: 
To preserve its independence, and give security against foreign ag-
gression and encroachment, is the highest duty of every nation, 
and to attain these ends nearly all other considerations are to be 
subordinated. It matters not in what form such aggression and en-
croachment come, whether from the foreign nation acting in its 
national character, or from vast hordes of its people crowding in 
upon us .... 200 
At issue in the case, Field suggested, was not merely congressional authority 
to exclude foreigners; that Congress possessed such authority had been well 
established at least since the Court decided the Passenger Cases forty years 
earlier. The passage constructs Chinese laborers as agents of foreign aggres-
sion. This is remarkable for at least two reasons. First, it defies the basic 
rule of international law that "aliens are responsible only for ... offenses in 
which their nation bears a part," in which case they become "enemy 
aliens.''201 Not even Field suggests, however, that Chinese laborers were 
literally agents of China. Second, even if Chinese laborers had been acting 
as agents of their home government, at the time the case was decided the 
United States enjoyed cordial relations with China, at least formally, and the 
1880 treaty had guaranteed to Chinese laborers then residing in the United 
States "all the rights, privileges, immunities and exemptions which are ac-
corded to the citizens ... of the most favored nation."202 Under the law of 
nations, Chinese laborers were therefore "alien friends," however undesir-
able they may have been to members of Congress or the justices of the Su-
preme Court. 
After thus collapsing key distinctions between, first, China "acting in 
its national character" and the "vast hordes" of Chinese subjects, and, sec-
199 Id. 
200 Id. at 606. 
201 The Passenger Cases, 48 u.s. 283, 510 (1849) (Daniel, J., dissenting); see supra text 
accompanying notes 97-98. 
202 Immigration Treaty of 1880, supra note 135, art 1. 
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ond, alien friends and alien enemies, Field turned to the nature of Congress's 
power of exclusion: 
If ... the government of the United States, through its legislative 
department, considers the presence of foreigners of a different race 
in this country, who will not assimilate with us, to be dangerous to 
its peace and security, their exclusion is not to be stayed because at 
the time there are no actual hostilities with the nation of which the 
foreigners are subjects. The existence of war would render the 
necessity of the proceeding only more obvious and pressing. The 
same necessity . . . may arise when war does not exist, and the 
same authority [applies] .... In both cases its determination is 
conclusive upon the judiciary.203 
As we saw in Part I, beginning with Miln in 1837 and continuing up through 
Chew Heong in 1884, the authority to regulate immigration and to exclude 
specific classes of immigrants derived from Congress's constitutionally enu-
merated power to regulate commerce. That authority accommodated the ac-
knowledged foreign-affairs dimension of federal immigration policy, and it 
was subject to meaningful judicially enforceable constraints. The above pas-
sage represents a stark rejection of that framework. Congress's authority to 
exclude Chinese laborers derived not from its commerce power, but was "an 
incident of sovereignty belonging to the government of the United States."204 
Perhaps most remarkably, that authority was now identical to Congress's 
power to conduct war. As an act undertaken to repel foreign aggression, 
Congress's decision to void Chae Chan Ping's certificate of reentry was 
"conclusive upon the judiciary."205 
Having thus reconstructed the federal immigration power, Field retroac-
tively revised the Court's rationale in previous decisions upholding Con-
gress's authority to exclude undesirable classes of Europeans. He wrote: 
The exclusion of paupers, criminals and persons afflicted with in-
curable diseases, for which statutes have been passed, is only an 
application of the same power to particular classes of persons, 
whose presence is deemed injurious or a source of danger to the 
country. . .. [T]here has never been any question as to the power 
to exclude them. The power is constantly exercised; its existence 
is involved in the right of self-preservation.206 
Just five years earlier in the Head Money Cases, the Court had reaffirmed 
that a federal statute "designed to mitigate the evils inherent in the business 
of bringing foreigners to this country" lay squarely within Congress's com-
203 The Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. 581, 606 (1889). 
204 [d. at 609. 
205 [d. Field added that "[i]f there be any just ground of complaint on the part of China, it 
must be made to the political department of our government .... " [d. 
206 [d. at 608. 
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merce power.207 In the Chinese Exclusion Case, mitigating those evils be-
came a matter of national self-preservation, as immigrants' very foreignness 
displaced the commercial character of the immigration system as an irreduc-
ible premise of the immigration power. 
2. The Triumph of Plenary Power: Legislative and Judicial 
Consolidation 
Any suspicion that the reconstructed federal immigration power an-
nounced in the Chinese Exclusion Case was an anomaly, borne of anti-Chi-
nese racism or the singular features of the Chinese Exclusion Act, 
evaporated almost immediately. In 1891, two interrelated developments-
the first legislative, the second judicial-projected Justice Field's framework 
beyond Chinese exclusion and onto the nation's general immigration laws. 
First, Congress enacted the Immigration Act of 1891,208 which foreclosed 
access to the federal courts for aliens denied entry by federal immigration 
inspectors. Second, in upholding this jurisdiction stripping provision, the 
Supreme Court confirmed that, notwithstanding Justice Field's earlier focus 
on the special difficulties associated with Chinese immigration, neither the 
outcome of the Chinese Exclusion Case nor the national security rationale 
were contingent on the particularities of the Chinese menace.2OO Congress's 
authority over all foreign immigration was inherent in the nation's sover-
eignty, calculated to defend the nation against foreign aggression, and con-
clusive upon the judicial department. Two years later, the Court extended 
this principle to cover not only the exclusion of foreigners, but also the ex-
pulsion of resident aliens.210 
The Immigration Act of 1891 modified the existing immigration frame-
work in three important respects. First, it supplemented the previous list of 
excludable classes with "persons likely to become a public charge," among 
other additions.2Il Second, it assigned exclusive authority to administer the 
immigration laws, including the actual inspection of immigrants, to a na-
tional Superintendent of Immigration lodged within the U.S. Treasury De-
partment. 212 Third, and most important for the trajectory of the federal 
immigration power, the Act made final the decisions of inspection officers 
207 The Head Money Cases, 112 U.S. 580, 595 (1884); see supra text accompanying notes 
125-127. 
208Jmmigration Act of 1891, ch. 551, 26 Stat. 1084. 
209 See Nishimura Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S. 651, 663-64 (1891). 
210 See Fong Yue ling v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 731-32 (1893). 
211 Immigration Act of 1891, ch. 551, § I, 26 Stat. 1084. The Act provided "that the 
following classes shall be excluded from admission into the United States ... : All idiots, 
insane persons, paupers or persons likely to become a public charge, persons suffering from a 
loathsome or a dangerous contagious disease, persons who have been convicted of a felony or 
other infamous crime or misdemeanor involving moral turpitude, polygamists, and also any 
person whose ticket or passage is paid for with the money of another or who is assisted to 
come .... " ld. 
212ld. § 7. 
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"touching the right of any alien to land," subject to review only by the 
Superintendent of Immigration and the Secretary of the Treasury.2I3 Re-
markably, this provision received no attention during the otherwise rich and 
extensive legislative debates over the 1891 Act.214 
In Nishimura Ekiu v. United States, the Court interpreted the 1891 Act 
to virtually foreclose judicial review of administrative immigration deci-
sions, thus consolidating a foundational element of modem immigration ex-
ceptionalism. Nishimura Ekiu, a Japanese woman, arrived in the port of San 
Francisco on May 7, 1891, just two months after Congress had passed the 
1891 Act. The California immigration commissioner, acting under the au-
thority of the Treasury Secretary, prohibited Ekiu from landing and detained 
her in custody pending her return to Japan.215 Later that day, the federal 
district court in San Francisco issued a writ of habeas corpus. On May 18, 
the federal inspector for the port of San Francisco, who had been appointed 
by the Treasury Secretary just four days earlier, intervened in opposition to 
the writ, claiming that Ekiu was excludable under the 1891 Act as a person 
"liable to become a public charge,"216 and, further, that his decision to deny 
admission was not reviewable by the court. The circuit court excluded from 
the hearing on Ekiu's petition evidence offered in support of her right to 
land, and held that under the 1891 Act the inspector's decision was final and 
not subject to judicial review.217 The Supreme Court affirmed. 
Justice Gray's opinion for the Court would do more than any other to 
establish the basic terms of the federal immigration power for the next cen-
tury. He declared at the outset: 
It is an accepted maxim of international law that every sovereign 
nation has the power, as inherent in sovereignty, and essential to 
self-preservation, to forbid the entrance of foreigners within its do-
minions, or to admit them only in such cases and upon such condi-
tions as it may see fit to prescribe .... In the United States this 
power is invested in the national government, to which the Consti-
tution has committed the entire control of international relations, 
in peace as well as in war. 2lS 
This formulation of the plenary power doctrine became the primary rhetori-
cal and doctrinal touchstone for subsequent immigration cases. First, the 
passage reaffirmed the Court's conclusion in the Chinese Exclusion Case 
that Congress's authority to exclude aliens derived from the nation's inherent 
2131d. § 8. 
214 SALYER, supra note 15, at 26-27. 
215 Nishimura Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S. 651, 652 (l891). The commissioner appar-
ently determined that Ekiu was excludable under the Immigration Act of 1882, though the 
Supreme Court's opinion does not note the specific grounds of her exclusion. ld. 
2161d. at 656. 
217 See id. 
218 I SIR ROBERT PHILLIMORE, COMMENTARrES ON INTERNATIONAL LAW ch. 10, § 220 (3d 
ed. 1888); id. at 659 (citing 2 EMER DE VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS §§ 94, 100 (l797}). 
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sovereignty under international law. Second, Gray's reference to "self-pres-
ervation" invoked Justice Field's national security rationale, and extended 
that rationale to the regulation of all immigrants, not just Chinese laborers. 
Third, Gray established that the regulation of all immigration covered by the 
1891 Act-that is, all non-Chinese immigration-lay squarely within the 
domain of foreign relations. This formulation accomplished all of these 
things, moreover, by way of reviewing a statutory provision the express pur-
pose of which was merely to prevent public economic dependency, and 
which applied overwhelmingly to European immigrants. It may be tempting 
to interpret the opinion as simply a rote application of a rule adopted previ-
ously in a different, unique context. As Part II.A demonstrated, however, 
Americans' assessments of Chinese and European immigration bore remark-
able similarities. It was the shared terms of their respective critiques that 
permitted the Court to transpose the national security rationale from the con-
text of Chinese exclusion to all other immigration. 219 
Most importantly, the Court upheld the provision of the 1891 Act fore-
closing recourse to the federal courts for aliens judged inadmissible by fed-
eral inspectors. Gray reasoned: 
It is not within the province of the judiciary to order that foreign-
ers who have never been naturalized, nor acquired any domicile or 
residence within the United States, nor even been admitted into the 
country pursuant to law, shall be permitted to enter, in opposition 
to the constitutional and lawful measures of the legislative and ex-
ecutive branches of the national government.220 
The decision to deny admission to a would-be immigrant could be, by virtue 
of her alienage, consigned exclusively to the "political departments" of the 
government. With respect to aliens, the Court concluded, "the decisions of 
executive or administrative officers, acting within powers expressly con-
219 Notwithstanding his invocation of inherent sovereignty, however, Gray did not entirely 
sever from the Constitution Congress's authority to exclude immigrants. While the passage 
appeared to claim that the "plenary" nature of that power flowed from the United States' 
inherent sovereignty as an independent nation, its actual source, as well as its locus of opera-
tion within the federal government, remained more ambiguous. The power resided in the na-
tional government because the Constitution had vested it there, Gray suggested. The power to 
exclude aliens "belongs to the political department of the government," he continued, "and 
may be exercised either through treaties made by the President and Senate, or through statutes 
enacted by Congress, upon whom the Constitution has conferred power to regulate commerce 
with foreign nations .... " Nishimura Ekiu, 142 U.S. at 659. Even as the Court rooted 
modem immigration exceptionalism in a theory of inherent sovereignty, therefore, it continued 
to appeal to constitutionally enumerated powers, including the commerce power, as a supple-
mental source of authority. 
22°ld. at 660. Justice Gray elaborated: "[T]he final determination of those facts may be 
intrusted [sic] by Congress to executive officers; and [when] ... a statute gives a discretion-
ary power to an officer, to be exercised by him upon his own opinion of certain facts, he is 
made the sole and exclusive judge of the existence of those facts, and no other tribunal, unless 
expressly authorized by law to do so, is at liberty to re-examine or controvert the sufficiency of 
the evidence on which he acted." [d. 
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ferred by Congress, are due process of law."221 In contrast to the purpose-
oriented police and commerce rationales that prevailed throughout the nine-
teenth century, the decision thus staked the source, nature, and scope of the 
immigration authority on the non-citizenship of the persons against whom it 
was exercised. 
Two years later, in Fang Yue Ting, a sharply divided Court extended the 
plenary power doctrine from the exclusion of aliens to their deportation.222 
At issue in the case was a provision of the Geary Act renewing for a second 
ten-year term the Chinese exclusion policy enacted in 1882. The Act re-
quired all Chinese laborers within the United States at the time of its passage 
to apply within one year for a "certificate of residence."223 Any Chinese 
laborer who refused to comply would be adjudged to be in the United States 
unlawfully, and subject to arrest and deportation unless he could establish, 
first, "that by reason of accident, sickness, or other unavoidable cause, he 
has been unable to procure his certificate," and, second, "by at least one 
credible white witness, that he was a resident of the United States at the time 
of the passage of this act."224 Chinese immigrants organized a massive cam-
paign of resistance to the certificate program. As a result, when the registra-
tion deadline passed on May 5, 1893, only 13,242 Chinese in the United 
States had registered, leaving an estimated 85,000 in violation of the law and 
subject to deportation.225 Each of the three petitioners alleged that he had 
been arrested and detained without due process of law, and maintained that 
the Geary Act's registration requirement was unconstitutional and void.226 
The Court responded with a sweeping affirmation of Congress's broad 
authority not only to exclude foreigners, but to expel resident aliens. The 
majority opinion, again authored by Justice Gray, began by restating the 
"general principles of public law which lie at the foundation of these 
cases."227 Those general principles now consisted entirely of the passage 
from Nishimura Ekiu discussed above, defining the federal immigration 
power as one "inherent in sovereignty and essential to self preservation."228 
Gray then reprised Justice Field's "repelling foreign aggression" rationale 
221 [d. 
222 149 U.S. 698 (1893). 
223 [d. at 703. 
224 Act of May 5, 1892, ch. 60, § 6, 27 Stat. 25. 
225 SALYER, supra note 15, at 47-48. 
226 Fong Yue Ting, 149 U.S. at 703. Two of the petitioners, Fong Yue Ting and Wong 
Quan, had refused to register. The third, Lee Joe, had attempted to register but was refused a 
certificate on the ground that "the witnesses whom he produced to prove that he was entitled 
to the certificate were persons of the Chinese race and not credible witnesses .... " [d. 
227 [d. at 704. 
228 Even as the Court insisted that the plenary nature of the United States' authority to 
exclude and expel aliens flowed from its inherent sovereignty as an independent nation, how-
ever, as in Nishimura Ekiu, Gray continued to summon the Constitution. The President and 
Congress "are vested by the Constitution with the entire control of international relations," he 
explained. /d. at 711. The Constitution confers on the President the authority to conduct the 
nation's diplomatic relations, and makes him the Commander-in-Chief of the army and navy. 
Likewise, "[tJhe Constitution has granted to Congress the power to regulate commerce with 
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from the Chinese Exclusion Case. He defined the exclusion and expulsion 
of aliens as a matter of foreign relations, and war and peace; warned that 
anything short of an absolute power to exclude and expel could subject the 
nation to "the control of another power"; and conflated Chinese immigrants 
with the Chinese nation, and alien friends with alien enemies.229 Notably, 
the Court did not take the position that Congress and the Executive operated 
outside of the Constitution in their creation and enforcement of the immigra-
tion laws, but rather that any assessment of the constitutionality of such laws 
had been consigned to the political departments.23o 
Justices Field and Brewer lodged lengthy and forceful dissents.231 Both 
objected that the Geary Act's registration requirement imposed punishment 
without due process of law and that the petitioners were entitled to constitu-
tional protection as persons residing lawfully within the United States. 
Brewer offered a direct and trenchant critique of the inherent powers 
doctrine: 
This doctrine of powers inherent in sovereignty is one both indefi-
nite and dangerous. Where are the limits to such powers to be 
found? . . . Is it within legislative capacity to declare the limits? If 
so, then the mere assertion of an inherent power creates it, and 
despotism exists. May the courts establish the boundaries? 
Whence do they obtain the authority for this? ... The expulsion of 
a race may be within the inherent powers of a despotism.232 
Though Justice Field's objection to the Court's decision hinged formally on 
the "wide and essential difference" between "legislation for the exclusion of 
Chinese persons ... and legislation for the deportation of those who have 
acquired a residence,"233 the author of the Chinese Exclusion Case used most 
foreign nations, including ... the bringing of persons into the ports of the United States .... " 
[d. at 712. 
229 [d. at 705. Gray likewise revisited Justice Field's historical narrative describing the 
nation's actual experience with Chinese immigration as a failed referendum on the hopes and 
ideals embodied in the Burlingame Treaty. "After some years' experience under that treaty," 
he wrote, "the government of the United States was brought to the opinion that the presence 
within our territory of large numbers of Chinese laborers, of a distinct race and religion, re-
maining strangers in the land, residing apart by themselves, tenaciously adhering to the cus-
toms and usages of their own country, unfamiliar with our institutions, and apparently 
incapable of assimilating with our people, might endanger good order, and be injurious to the 
public interests .... " /d. at 717. 
230 [d. at 731 ("The question whether, and upon what conditions, these aliens shall be 
permitted to remain within the United States being one to be determined by the political de-
partments of the government ... the judicial department cannot properly express an opinion 
upon the wisdom, the policy, or the justice of the measures enacted by Congress in the exercise 
of the powers confided to it by the Constitution over this subject."). 
231 Chief Justice Fuller dissented as well, though briefly. He sharply distinguished the 
power to exclude from the power to expel, and argued that the government "cannot, in virtue 
of any delegated power, or ... of a supposed inherent sovereignty, arbitrarily deal with per-
sons lawfully within the peace of its dominion." [d. at 762 (Fuller, C.J., dissenting). 
232 [d. at 737 (Brewer, J., dissenting). 
233 [d. at 746 (Field, J., dissenting). 
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of his dissent to attack what he viewed as the majority's inappropriate con-
flation of alien friends with alien enemies. "Aliens from countries at peace 
with us," he explained, "domiciled within our country by its consent, are 
entitled to all the guaranties for the protection of their persons and property 
which are secured to native-born citizens .... "234 Not since the infamous 
Alien Act of 1798, Field chided, "has any public man had the boldness to 
advocate the deportation of friendly aliens in a time of peace."235 
Nishimura Ekiu and Fong Yue Ting barred judicial review not only of 
substantive immigration policy, but of procedural claims as well. As the 
Court stated in Nishimura Ekiu, "the decisions of executive or administra-
tive officers, acting within powers expressly conferred by Congress, are due 
process of law."236 A decade later, in The Japanese Immigrant Case,237 the 
Court retreated slightly, creating a narrow opening for procedural review. 
Notwithstanding the political departments' broad authority to exclude or ex-
pel aliens, Justice Harlan reasoned, the Court had never held that administra-
tive officers "may disregard the fundamental principles that inhere in 'due 
process of law' .... "238 An executive officer could not "arbitrarily ... 
cause an alien ... to be taken into custody and deported without giving him 
all opportunity to be heard .... "239 To be sure, the Court's review of the 
immigrant's (ultimately unsuccessful) procedural claim was stunningly def-
erential,240 and subsequent procedural claims virtually always failed. 241 Nev-
ertheless, The Japanese Immigrant Case did establish a formal doctrinal 
foothold for procedural due process claims that subsequently provided a 
doctrinal basis for meaningful, if still highly deferential, judicial review.242 
234 Id. at 754. 
m /d. at 750. 
236 Nishimura Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S. 651, 660 (1891); see also Lem Moon Sing 
v. United States, 158 U.S. 538, 544-46 (1894) (holding that the exclusion order of an executive 
officer was due process of law). 
237 Yamataya v. Fisher (The Japanese Immigrant Case), 189 U.S. 86 (1903). 
238 Id. at 100. 
239 Id. at 10 I. 
240 The petitioner, who had been excluded under the "public charge" provision of the 
1891 Act, claimed that she had not been afforded a meaningful opportunity to challenge the 
decision of the immigration officer. "It is true that she pleads a want of knowledge of our 
language; that she did not understand the nature and import of the questions propounded to 
her; that the investigation made was a 'pretended' one; and that she did not, at the time, know 
that the investigation had reference to her being deported from the country," the Court ac-
knowledged. But "[t]hese considerations cannot justify the intervention of the courts .... 
Whether further investigation should have been ordered was for the officers, charged with the 
execution of the statutes, to determine .... Suffice it to say, it does not appear that appellant 
was denied an opportunity to be heard .... If the appellant's want of knowledge of the English 
language put her at some disadvantage in the investigation conducted by that officer, that was 
her misfortune, and constitutes no reason, under the acts of Congress, or under any rule of law, 
for the intervention of the court by habeas corpus." Id. at 101-02. 
24. See, e.g., Oceanic Steam Navigation Co. v. Stranahan, 214 U.S. 320 (1909); United 
States v. Ju Toy, 198 U.S. 253 (1905); United States v. Sing Tuck, 194 U.S. 161 (1904). 
242 See Motomura, supra note 15, at 1652 (describing a due process revolution in immi-
gration law culminating in the Court's 1982 decision in Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21,33 
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CONCLUSION: TOWARD AN UNEXCEPTIONAL IMMIGRATION POWER 
The analysis set forth above functions as a historical critique of the 
contemporary immigration power in two respects. First, by drawing atten-
tion to the unique contingencies that surrounded the Court's adoption of the 
national security rationale for broad judicial deference, my analysis helps to 
historicize, or denaturalize, what remains a fundamental premise of immi-
gration exceptionalism today. As I argued in Part II, it was the historically 
novel association in the late nineteenth century between foreign pauper labor 
and foreign aggression that appeared to warrant categorically defining all 
laws touching on immigration as matters of national security. In response, 
the Supreme Court transformed the federal immigration power from a spe-
cies of commercial authority grounded in the Commerce Clause into a potent 
instrument of national self-defense, to be deployed against foreign aggres-
sion. The power continues to operate today as an extension of Congress's 
power to conduct foreign affairs and preserve national security,243 a power 
buffered against judicially enforceable constitutional constraints.244 Of 
(1982), in which the Court held that a returning alien was entitled to due process in her exclu-
sion hearing). 
243 As the Supreme Court recently declared in Demore v. Hyung Joon Kim, quoted at the 
beginning of this Article, judicial deference toward congressional-and, by delegation, execu-
tive-power over immigration is warranted because "any policy toward aliens is vitally and 
intricately interwoven with contemporaneous policies in regard to the conduct of foreign rela-
tions, the war power, and the maintenance of a republican form of government." Demore v. 
Hyung Joon Kim, 538 U.S. 510,522 (2003). The federal government, in particular, continues 
to invoke the national security rationale in its briefs to the Court. See, e.g., Brief of Respon-
dent at 25, Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53 (2001) (No. 99-2071) (urging the Court to uphold 
against an equal protection challenge a provision of the Immigration and Nationality Act mak-
ing children of unmarried citizen mothers born abroad U.S. citizens at birth, but requiring 
children of unmarried citizen fathers born abroad to take various affirmative steps to gain 
eligibility for U.S. citizenship, on the grounds that deference to the political branches "affords 
Congress the practical latitude it needs to fulfill its responsibilities for national security, for-
eign affairs, and nation-building"). 
244 While due process norins today provide the modem deportation regime with a "flexi-
ble touchstone of fundamental fairness," writes Daniel Kanstroom, the plenary power doctrine 
has "impeded the development of coherent substantive principles of constitutional deportation 
law." KANSTROOM, supra note 13, at 17. Two cases argued in 1976-Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 
787 (1977), and Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67 (1976)-serve as the primary doctrinal touch-
stones of the contemporary immigration power. As the Fiallo Court observed, "[olur cases 
'have long recognized the power to expel or exclude aliens as a fundamental sovereign attri-
bute exercised by the Government's political departments largely immune from judicial con-
trol.'" Fiallo, 430 U.S. at 792 (quoting Shaughnessy v. United States ex reI. Mezei, 345 U.S. 
206,210 (1953)). The Court had thus "repeatedly emphasized that 'over no conceivable sub-
ject is the legislative power of Congress more complete than it is over the admission of 
aliens.'" [d. at 792 (quoting Oceanic Steam Navigation, 214 U.S. at 339). Fiallo and Diaz 
rely directly and uncritically on 'he original plenary power cases, including the Chinese Exclu-
sion Case and Fong Yue Ting, a:, well as a series of cases decided in the early 1950s affording 
extraordinary deference to Congress and the Executive in their exclusion, detention, and de-
portation of aliens on ideological and "security" grounds. See, e.g., Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 
522,530-32 (1954) (upholding the deportation of a long-term resident alien under the Internal 
Security Act of 1950 on the ground of membership in the Communist Party between 1944 and 
1946, even in the absence of any evidence that the alien was aware of the Party's advocacy of 
the violent overthrow of the government); Mezei, 345 U.S. at 210 (upholding the exclusion and 
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course, demonstrating that the origins of a legal doctrine lie in an anachro-
nistic worldview does not necessarily render the doctrine itself obsolete or 
illegitimate. Denaturalizing the inherited premise of immigration exception-
alism does, however, better equip us to undertake a critical, clear-eyed reas-
sessment of the plenary power doctrine. 
Second, the history of the period before the adoption of the plenary 
power doctrine reminds us that many of the issues that animate most immi-
gration regulation today, as in the nineteenth century-labor, economic de-
pendency, and crime-do not bear an obvious connection with foreign 
affairs or national security. In the six decades preceding the Chinese Exclu-
sion Case, the states, and later the federal government, regulated pauperism 
and crime among immigrants, sought to mitigate the effect of immigrant 
labor on domestic wages, and managed the United States' commercial rela-
tions with foreign nations. This history begs the question of whether the 
issues that continue to underlie the vast majority of immigration lawmaking 
and enforcement today do not in fact have more in common with federal 
criminal law, the administration of public benefits, and the regulation of la-
bor markets-that is, matters that are today regulated under the commerce 
power and subject to normal constitutional constraints-than with the con-
duct of foreign affairs or national security. 
Although it is not the principal aim of this Article to set forth a specific 
proposal or strategy for doctrinal reform, I would like to sketch briefly a few 
practical implications of abandoning the categorical presumption that all 
laws and enforcement actions touching on immigration necessarily bear on 
foreign affairs or national security. Indeed, notwithstanding the extraordi-
nary durability of immigration exceptionalism, there is evidence that the fed-
eral courts' commitment to the plenary power doctrine has softened 
twenty-one-month detention of a returning long-term resident alien without a hearing on the 
basis of confidential "security" reasons, on the ground that the power to exclude and expel 
aliens is "a fundamental sovereign attribute exercised by the Government's political depart-
ments largely immune from judicial control"); Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 587-
90 (1952) (upholding the deportation of a long-term legal resident alien because of past mem-
bership in the Communist Party, even though he had terminated his membership years before 
Congress made it cause for deportation). 
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somewhat in recent decades. 24s Such a conceptual shift would effectively 
disaggregate immigration law for the purpose of constitutional review, thus 
245 This "softening" appears in two broad judicial trends. First, courts frequently smuggle 
substantive constitutional norms into their immigration decisions in the guise of ostensibly 
nonsubstantive review, such as procedural due process or statutory construction. As Hiroshi 
Motomura has demonstrated, "procedural due process claims have come to serve as surrogates 
... for the substantive constitutional rights that the plenary power doctrine appears to fore-
close." Motomura, supra note 15, at 1656. A judge who has constitutional reservations about 
the government's conduct can construe the constitutional challenge as "procedural," and then 
invalidate it on due process grounds, id. at 1628, thus "channel[ing] its substantive concerns 
through a mode of judicial review that smacked less of outright judicial supremacy .... " Jd. 
at 1647. The Court's recent decision in Zadvydas v. Davis suggests that statutory construction, 
too, can function as a kind of surrogate for substantive constitutional review. In that case, the 
Court read into a statute that appeared to authorize the indefinite detention of aliens pending 
removal an implicit time limitation of six months, in order to avoid a "serious constitutional 
problem." 533 U.S. 678, 690 (2001). 
Second, in at least two recent decisions, the Court has signaled a certain apprehension to-
ward the plenary power doctrine in general, and the national security rationale in particular. In 
Zadvydas, the offhand manner in which the Court shook off the historical weight of the ple-
nary power doctrine, casually observing that the immigration power was "subject to important 
constitutional limitations," suggests a majority resistant to the peremptory quality of the judi-
cial branch's traditionally broad deference in immigration matters. The Zadvydas Court like-
wise rejected the government's invocation of foreign affairs and national security as a warrant 
for broad deference. The Court specifically, if briefly, weighed and rejected the merits of the 
government's asserted "foreign policy consideration"-namely, the risk of interfering with 
"'sensitive' repatriation negotiations." Jd. at 696. "[N]either the Government nor the dis-
sents explain how a habeas court's efforts to determine the likelihood of repatriation could 
make a significant difference in this respect," the Court observed. Jd. Even in the context of 
the so-called "war on terrorism," the Court has declined to defer categorically to the govern-
ment's invocation of national security to shield from judicial review its detention of nonci-
tizens. In Boumediene v. Bush, for example, the Court extended habeas corpus rights to 
noncitizen Guantanamo detainees who had been designated "enemy combatants," notwith-
standing the government's asserted interest in "apprehend[ing] and detain[ing] those who 
pose a real danger to our security." 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2277 (2008). "In considering both the 
procedural and substantive standards used to impose detention to prevent acts of terrorism," 
the Court granted that "proper deference must be accorded to the political branches." Jd. at 
2276. However, Justice Kennedy reasoned, "[s]ecurity subsists, too, in fidelity to freedom's 
first principles." Jd. at 2277. "Chief among these," he continued, "are freedom from arbitrary 
and unlawful restraint and the personal liberty that is secured by adherence to the separation of 
powers. It is from these principles that the judicial authority to consider petitions for habeas 
corpus relief derive." Jd. To be sure, Boumediene is not an immigration case, and I do not 
claim that a decision declining to defer to the government's asserted national security interest 
in the context of the detention of enemy combatants necessarily translates directly to Con-
gress's plenary power over immigration. Its implications, if any, for constitutional immigra-
tion law are far from clear. It does demonstrate, however, that in certain contexts-even 
national security-the Court is prepared to rebuff the rationale for judicial deference that un-
dergirds immigration exceptionalism. 
I do not suggest, as some scholars have, that Zadvydas heralds the abandonment of the 
plenary power doctrine. See, e.g., Peter J. Spiro, Explaining the End of Plenary Power, 16 
GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 339 (2002). Indeed, even as Zadvydas gestured toward constitutionallimi-
tations on the immigration power, and imposed such a limitation through what can be charita-
bly described as a strained reading of the challenged statute, it also reaffirmed key precedential 
pillars of the plenary power doctrine-for example, Mezei, 345 U.S. at 212 (stating that 
"[w]hatever the procedure authorized by Congress is, is due process as far as an alien denied 
entry is concemed")-and provides little indication that the Court expects to engage in mean-
ingful review of clearly drawn congressional detention policy. Even after straining to avoid 
the "serious constitutional problem" that would be presented by a statutory provision authoriz-
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enabling both Congress and the Court to approach each aspect of immigra-
tion regulation on its own terms, in a manner appropriate to its specific con-
tent and context. "Immigration law" would be understood constitutionally 
not as a discreet body of law circumscribed by the noncitizens hip of its sub-
jects, but rather as a variegated constellation of regulations that often touch 
the constitutional rights of individuals and that occasionally implicate issues 
that may warrant heightened deference to Congress and the Executive. Re-
casting the federal immigration power as but one instance of Congress's 
"plenary" power to regulate commerce, for example, would carry with it a 
presumption that regulations of immigrants and immigration are subject to 
the same substantive, judicially enforceable constitutional norms as most 
other federal laws, including criminal laws, economic regulation, the admin-
istration of public benefits, and antidiscrimination laws. 
Under such an approach, the Court would subject the government's de-
tention of Hyung Joon Kim to the same "heightened, substantive due pro-
cess scrutiny"246 that applies when the state physically confines a citizen. In 
Kim's case, this would mean closely scrutinizing, and likely rejecting, Con-
gress's categorical judgment to subject an undifferentiated class of deport-
able criminal aliens to mandatory detention pending removal, and requiring 
instead an individualized assessment of both Kim's liberty interest and the 
government's asserted purpose. As Justice Souter wrote in dissent, "[d]ue 
process calls for an individual determination before someone is locked 
away."247 Abandoning the plenary power doctrine would subject a host of 
other areas of immigration law to meaningful and judicially enforceable con-
stitutional constraints, including procedural rights at the border;248 the right 
to challenge selection for removal on the basis of constitutionally protected 
speech or associations;249 and discrimination against aliens in the receipt of 
public benefits.250 
ing indefinite detention, the Court conceded that it would have had to uphold such a provision 
if the statute had been explicit: "Despite this constitutional problem, if 'Congress had made its 
intent' in the statute 'clear, we must give effect to that intent.'" Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 696 
(quoting Miller v. French, 530 U.S. 327, 336 (2000)); see generally ALEINIKOFF, supra note 
13. 
246 Hyung Joan Kim, 538 U.S. at 549 (Souter, J., dissenting) (quoting Reno v. Flores, 507 
U.S. 292, 316 (1993)). 
247 [d. at 551 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
248 See, e.g., Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 538 (1950) ("Whatever procedure 
authorized by Congress is, it is due process as far as an alien denied entry is concerned."). 
249 See, e.g., Reno v. Arab-American Anti-Discrimination Comm'n, 525 U.S. 471, 481-82 
(1999) (upholding a federal provision stripping the federal courts of jurisdiction to hear resi-
dent aliens' claims that they were targeted for deportation because of their affiliation with a 
politically unpopular group); Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522, 530-32 (1954) (upholding depor-
tation for past Communist Party membership); Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 587-
90 (1952) (same). 
250 Federal statutes that discriminate on the basis of alienage in the receipt of public bene-
fits receive considerable judicial deference. The leading case is Mathews v. Diaz, in which the 
Supreme Court held that a five-year residency requirement for participation in a federal medi-
cal insurance program did not deprive aliens of liberty or property without due process of law. 
426 U.S. 67, 69 (1976). The Court explained, "[t]he reasons that preclude judicial review of 
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* * * 
In 1954, the Supreme Court upheld the deportation of Juan Galvan, a 
thirty-year resident of the United States who had an American wife and four 
native-born children, because he had briefly been a member of the Commu-
nist Party at a time when such membership was neither illegal nor grounds 
for deportation. Writing for the Court, Justice Frankfurter acknowledged 
that because Galvan was a "person," and thus entitled to "the same protec-
tion for his life, liberty and property as ... a citizen," the decision "strikes 
one with a sense of harsh incongruity."251 "Much could be said for the 
view," he observed, "were we writing on a clean slate, that the Due Process 
Clause qualifies the scope of [Congress's] political discretion ... in regulat-
ing the entry and deportation of aliens."252 Frankfurter continued: 
But the slate is not clean. As to the extent of the power of Con-
gress under review, there is not merely a page of history, [citation 
omitted] but a whole volume. Policies pertaining to the entry of 
aliens and their right to remain here are peculiarly concerned with 
the political conduct of government. . .. [T]hat the formulation 
of these polices is entrusted exclusively to Congress has become 
about as firmly imbedded in the legislative and judicial tissues of 
our body politic as any aspect of our government. 253 
Frankfurter's misgivings about the result notwithstanding, the justices in the 
majority were "not prepared to deem ourselves wiser or more sensitive to 
human rights than our predecessors,"254 and thus grudgingly upheld Galvan's 
deportation. 
Frankfurter was certainly correct that the slate is not clean. As the his-
tory recounted in this Article suggests, the "slate" of the American immigra-
tion power is in fact a palimpsest of anachronisms: alien invasions, 
existential threats to the republic, and simple racism. If the plenary power 
doctrine is going to survive into the future-if Congress and the Court are 
going to continue to withhold from immigrants important constitutional 
rights to which they, as persons, would otherwise be entitled-it should at 
the very least be on grounds that today's policymakers and judges recognize 
as legitimate and intellectually coherent. 
political questions also dictate a narrow standard of review of decisions made by the Congress 
or the President in the area of immigration and naturalization." [d. at 81-82. Based on the 
Court's reasoning in Mathews, the lower federal courts have applied rational basis review to 
the exclusion of permanent resident aliens from various federally funded welfare programs 
under the Welfare Reform Act of 1996. See, e.g., Shalala v. City of Chicago, 189 F.3d 598 
(7th Cir. 1999); Rodriguez ex reI. Rodriguez v. United States, 169 F.3d 1342 (11th Cir. 1999); 
see generally ALEINIKOFF, supra note 13, at 166. 
251 Galvan, 347 U.S. at 530. 
252 [d. at 530-31. 
253 [d. at 531 (citation omitted). 
254 [d. 
